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AN ALTERNATIVE STORY OF THE LAW AND
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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the history of the regulation of risk
management in the banking industry. Despite the centrality of risk
management to contemporary banking law and regulation, its fundamental
precepts have largely escaped scrutiny. This Article first summarizes what
it means to manage risk and then contrasts a traditional story of risk
management regulation with an alternative story. The traditional story
posits that regulatory interventions are practical, functional responses to
threats to the achievement of regulators’ statutory mandates of system-wide
financial stability and institution-level safety and soundness. In the course
of summarizing this traditional account, the Article undertakes the first
systematic review of the legislative and regulatory actions by which risk
management became a public regulatory subject. The alternative story, by
contrast, acknowledges the empirical fact of risk management as an
enhanced regulatory priority, but interrogates its normative assumptions. It
presents the regulatory focus on risk management as more of a cultural
crutch in response to growing anxiety about endemic uncertainty in
financial markets—as a reflection of the aspirations underlying the practice
rather than the practice as such. Particular attention is given to how
regulators have prioritized questions of risk control over more basic
questions of risk assessment, and, in the process, have failed to take
account of how banks and regulators view risk in different terms. Though
its implications are troubling, this alternative story sheds light on where
authorities should focus reform efforts to improve risk management
regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, the regulation of risk management has become one
of the key pillars of bank regulation, with Congress and bank regulators
both routinely addressing the internal corporate risk management practices
of banks. As early as the mid-1990s, it became plausible to refer to a “new
religion” of risk management in finance.1 Despite the centrality of risk
management to banking law and regulation, its fundamental precepts have
largely escaped scrutiny.2 The dearth of attention to risk management
regulation does not reflect a lack of relevance so much as the disorganized,
1. Peter L. Bernstein, The New Religion of Risk Management, HARV. BUS. REV. 47
(Mar. 1996).
2. Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the
Stonier Graduate School of Banking, Washington, D.C. (Jun. 12, 2006) [hereinafter
Bernanke
Stonier
School
Remarks]
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20060612a.htm
(describing
regulators’ review of risk management systems as the “heart of the modern bank
examination”).
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often confounding, manner by which authorities have addressed the issue.
This article undertakes the first exploration of the dogmas and the history
of this new near-religious faith on the part of public law authorities that
regulated banks are able to manage and control risk. The research
presented here traces how these authorities have sought to influence risk
management norms and practices. It uncovers a regulatory canon that has
set forth increasingly expansive mandates that bank boards of directors and
senior management understand and control risks. While articulating everbroader expectations of risk control, these authorities have left critically
undeveloped key questions of risk assessment—including, most
prominently, questions that touch on organizational goals and the events
that threaten those goals. A troubling alternative history emerges from this
study: risk management regulation is in practice more an attempt to
maintain the appearance of control than an effective regulatory program
promoting a managerial antidote to new sources of instability and volatility
in financial markets.
Part I introduces the idea of risk management and presents a general
theory of risk management. The general theory describes a broader
intellectual and organizational discipline than the set of practices familiar
to bank risk managers. By starting from a broad reference frame, it will be
easier to identify certain idiosyncrasies, described further in Parts II and III,
of contemporary risk management practice as it has been developed by
industry and influenced by bank regulatory law. Risk management is
presented as a two-part process consisting of risk assessment and risk
control. Risk assessment describes the processes by which an organization
considers its goals and explores how contingent events might affect the
achievement of those goals. These processes therefore occur along a
political-rhetorical dimension that asks, “What objectives matter to the
organization, and what constitutes a threat to them?” and a descriptiverelational dimension that asks, “In what ways do future contingent events
affect the achievement of these objectives?” Once threats to organizational
goals are identified and their causal environments are explored, risk control
requires an organization to put in place procedures designed to manage
those threats in a consistent, reliable way.
Part II describes what I term the traditional story of risk management,
according to which regulatory interventions are practical, functional
responses to threats to the achievement of regulators’ statutory mandates of
system-wide financial stability and institution-level safety and soundness.
This traditional theory portrays a dynamic, dialogic process whereby
regulators identify risks and vulnerabilities and deputize bank risk
management departments to counteract them, producing increasingly
detailed guidance and imposing ever-wider expectations along the way.
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Though the story depicted here is labeled “traditional,” its proponents selfconsciously advocated for and utilized non-traditional regulatory
approaches. The regulatory interventions in this context eschewed
conventional regulatory techniques that mandated organizational behaviors
or regulated outputs. Instead, public lawmakers focused on influencing the
internal bank systems and procedures on which financial stability and
safety-and-soundness depended. Though this phenomenon is not unique to
banking law and regulation, bank regulators’ approach to risk management
regulation is certainly one of the most salient examples of these changing
regulatory techniques.
This story begins in sub-Part A with a brief description of the
development of derivatives markets, and highlights the dual nature of
derivatives as both risk-reducing and risk-expanding instruments.
Particular attention is given to how derivatives expand the dimensionality
of risk and introduce new managerial challenges. Next, sub-Part B traces
how internal controls became a subject of public law and regulation.
Public law authorities increasingly came to recognize that the
organizational complexity of regulated entities, both inside and outside the
banking sector, increasingly required regulators to focus their attention on
systems of internal control. Internal controls refer to the set of: (i) predefined organizational responses to particular risks; and (ii) those processes
to make sure the correct responses are in fact being applied and working as
intended. These regulatory interventions began in the narrow context of
legal compliance and financial reporting, but private sector norms of
internal control gradually expanded to direct organizations to implement
systematized, rationalized approaches to all risks.
Sub-Parts C and D describe how bank regulators came to embrace a
broader, more comprehensive form of risk management that went beyond
internal control. In particular, sub-Part C examines bank regulatory
guidance concerning risk management to be considered during the bank
examination process, when regulators and bank management interface and
discuss, usually informally, bank performance in the shadow of regulators’
more draconian enforcement powers. The bank examination process
during this period transformed from a review of bank balance sheets and
loan books to a full-fledged review of corporate risk management
programs. This sub-Part analyzes selected regulatory actions and uncovers
three predominant stages of risk management regulation during this period:
(i) responsibility allocation and internal risk control; (ii) threat description
and control; and (iii) construction of a system of comprehensive enterprise
protection. As regulators moved through the successive stages, they set
forth increasingly broad mandates for banks to understand and control
risks. Sub-Part D documents how the capital adequacy regime, the linchpin
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of the bank regulatory apparatus, also transformed into risk management
regulation. Starting in the 1990s and continuing into the 2000s, the bank
capital adequacy rules gradually came to set bank capital requirements by
reference to estimates of exposures generated and used by internal risk
management departments, another example of regulators attempting to
shape risk management practices.
Part III presents a contrasting alternative story of risk management
regulation. This alternative story acknowledges the empirical fact of risk
management as an enhanced organizational and regulatory priority, but
interrogates its normative assumptions. It presents the regulatory focus on
risk management as more of a cultural crutch in response to growing
anxiety about endemic uncertainty, framing regulation as a reflection of the
aspirations underlying risk management rather than risk management as
such. It sees in risk management a placeholder delimiting the range of
objects that demand organizational control rather than the range of objects
that are in fact susceptible to such control. According to this alternative
story, it is unsurprising that research into risk management reveals what
might otherwise seem a paradox: risk management is “accepted by all” in
spite of a poor track record.3 Part III explains further why this equivocal
record of risk management regulation results from the tendency of bank
regulators to privilege risk control over fundamental, but contestable, issues
that touch on risk assessment. Simplifying only slightly, regulators have
commanded banks to control risk, but offer little guidance on how banks
are to identify threats or how much effort banks are expected to spend
exploring how those threats might materialize. Particular attention is given
to: (i) how the divergent microeconomic incentives of bank management
and bank regulators complicate the political-rhetorical dimension of risk
assessment; and (ii) how the introduction of complexity into financial
markets frustrates the descriptive-relational dimension of risk assessment.
Whether risk management regulation in the banking sector will overcome
the shortcomings identified by the alternative story and meet the
expectations of the traditional story will depend on the extent to which
regulators are able to engage the risk assessment process as such and foster
a new mindful decision-making infrastructure within bank boardrooms and
executive suites.

3. GRANT KIRKPATRICK, ORG. ECON. COOP. DEV., THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
LESSONS
FROM
THE
FINANCIAL
CRISIS
6
(2009),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/1/42229620.pdf
[hereinafter
OECD
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REPORT].
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RISK MANAGEMENT AS RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK
CONTROL

The term “risk management” is overbroad and in need of some
conceptual splitting before it can be a proper subject of inquiry.4 In much
of the financial and practitioner literature on risk management, the
embedded assumptions that condition the practice of risk management in
financial institutions are not acknowledged. This Part will take up the
following questions: “What is risk?”; “What does it mean to manage
risk?”; and “What is the role of regulators in risk management?” The
general framework advocated here conceives of risk management as a twopart process. First, an organization must engage in risk assessment, a task
that requires consideration of organizational goals and deliberation on how
future contingent events affect achievement of those goals. The second
part of risk management requires an organization to control, or manage, the
risks identified and explored during the risk assessment exercise.
Any analysis of risk assessment must necessarily start with the term
“risk,” which in its broadest sense is a descriptive, relational concept
linking possible future events to observable future states of the world.5
Starting from this broad definition, risk analysis must begin with defining
“risk objects”—i.e., those ideas about how contingencies relate causally to
future harm.6 This basic building block of risk analysis then describes the
connection between possibility and reality.7 A risk might exist only where
a future contingency has a possibility of occurring and impacting the future
in some relevant manner. With advances in statistical science and data
gathering techniques, risk is increasingly expressed in quantitative terms.8
However, nothing prevents even those risks that are presently
incapable of being analyzed in terms of probabilities from being studied
and understood as a risk object in terms of cause-and-effect. When risk
objects become the units of inquiry, the oft-echoed distinction between
4. See MICHAEL POWER, ORGANIZED UNCERTAINTY 3 (2007) (“Philosophers remind us
to be wary of assuming that our most treasured nouns refer to anything, and this is nowhere
more true than in the case of ‘risk.’”).
5. ORTWIN RENN, RISK GOVERNANCE 1-2 (2008). “Risk” is itself a highly contested
concept. See Ortwin Renn, Three Decades of Risk Research: Accomplishments and New
Challenges, 1 J. RISK RESEARCH 49, 50 (1998) [hereinafter Accomplishments and
Challenges] (“Talking about risks faces the immediate danger that everybody talks about
something different . . . .”).
6. Stephen Hilgartner, The Social Construction of Risk Objects: Or, How to Pry Open
Networks of Risk, in ORGANIZATIONS, UNCERTAINTIES AND RISKS 39 (Lee Ben Clarke &
James F. Short eds. 1992).
7. Accomplishments and Challenges, supra note 5, at 51.
8. See generally THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS (1995) (discussing the
modern rise of quantification and its effect on culture).
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uncertainty and risk ceases to demarcate the frontier of risk management.
Even when the causal environment cannot be expressed probabilistically, it
may still allow for prudential and precautionary efforts to minimize risk or
counterfactual simulations to explore the impact of events.
This
intellectual discipline especially helps when exploring remote events with
potentially catastrophic impacts.
But this descriptive-relational dimension of risk describes only part of
the nature of risk. In order for a contingency to amount to a risk, it must
also have a political and rhetorical dimension. For example, the
movements of an ant from time T1 to time T2 can be measured using
probabilistic analysis of cause-and-effect, but until a wager is hazarded on
the whereabouts of the ant, we would not describe the ant’s movements as
risky. As David Garland observes, “risks never exist outside of our
knowledge of them.”9 Instead, “[t]hey are the product of future-oriented
human calculations—assessments made by people in the face of an
uncertain world and the possibilities that it holds for them.”10 Any
definition of risk therefore requires value judgments regarding which
“future-oriented human calculations” should be the focus of analysis.11
Values, priorities, and risk perceptions must be considered in this
analysis.12
For example, consider how risk assessors might compare the relative
riskiness of Product A, which will result in fifty deaths per year from
9. David Garland, The Rise of Risk, in RISK AND MORALITY 48, 52 (Richard Victor
Ericson & Aaron Doyle eds., 2003).
10. Id.; see also François Ewald, Insurance and Risk, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT 197,
199 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991) (“Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in
reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyzes
the danger, considers the event.”).
11. Garland, supra note 9, at 52; see also Baruch Fischhoff et al., Defining Risk, 17
POL’Y SCI. 123, 123-24, 137 (1984) (explaining the effects of a changing definition of risk
according to decision-maker or the problem he faces); cf. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE
GODS: THE REMARKABLE HISTORY OF RISK 8 (1996) (“The word ‘risk’ derives from the
early Italian risicare, which means ‘to dare.’ In this sense, risk is a choice rather than a fate.
The actions we dare to take . . . are what the story of risk is all about.”).
12. See RENN, supra note 5, at 2-4 (discussing the debate about whether risks are
socially constructed or real phenomena). Where perceptions of risk are out of step with
objective scientific evidence regarding the future probabilities and harms, a key component
of risk management is to bring perceptions up to date. That said,
[a] vast majority of studies on risk perception and concerns tends to show,
however, that most of the worries are not related to blatant errors or poor
judgment, but to divergent views about the tolerability of remaining uncertainty,
short-term versus long-term impacts, the trustworthiness of risk-regulating or
risk-managing agencies, and the experience of inequity or injustice with regard
to the distribution of benefits and risks.
Id. at 3.
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isolated malfunctions; Product B, which generally functions reliably but is
prone to a single, once-in-four-years large accident causing 150 deaths; and
Product C, which will never malfunction but will produce latent
carcinogenic effects on all users. Here, the risk assessor has already
completed the technical, probabilistic assessment of the likelihood of future
state outcomes. In order to conduct a discussion about the relative risks of
Product A, Product B, and Product C, however, the risk assessor must
familiarize himself with matters touching on human values. He must
consider, for example, whether the population prefers to take a risk that
will result in the deaths of a few people regularly or a risk that will rarely,
though reliably, result in the deaths of many people. This process of risk
assessment, which is different than risk management, consists of the
following analytical steps: (i) identifying future state outcomes that affect
the values of the risk-assessing entity; (ii) formulating a way to measure or
otherwise assess the possibilities of such outcomes; and (iii) aggregating
different classes of outcomes and articulating their probabilities using
language that permits comparison, priority-setting, and decision-making.13
Task (i) describes the political-rhetorical dimension of risk. Task (ii)
relates to the causal environment linking future states to contingent events,
and therefore describes the descriptive-relational dimension of risk. Task
(iii) bridges risk assessment with the distinct, but critically interdependent,
challenge of risk control.
Conceived of broadly, then, risk assessment includes the entire field of
contingencies that affect matters of concern in recognizable ways. Thus
defined, a comprehensive program of risk assessment and management
would require considering the likelihood of all possible future world states
that might affect outcomes of interest to the assessor.14 Once risks are
assessed, questions of risk management arise concerning allocations of
organizational responsibility and design of information systems for
assuring risk control and monitoring consistent with risk tolerance levels.15
This new notion of management of risk necessarily entails control over the
13. Accomplishments and Challenges, supra note 5, at 51.
14. See Jerome R. Ravetz, Public Perceptions of Acceptable Risks as Evidence for the
Cognitive, Technical, and Social Structure, in TECHNOLOGICAL RISK 45, 47 (Rob Coppock
et al. eds. 1980) (“The hope that one can produce a taxonomy, evaluation, and finally a
technical fix to the problems of risks is in substance as ambitious as the program of putting
all of human experience and value onto a scale of measurement for mathematical or political
manipulation.”).
15. See Bridget M. Hutter & Michael Power, Organizational Encounters with Risk: An
Introduction, in ORGANIZATIONAL ENCOUNTERS WITH RISK 1 (Bridget M. Hutter & Michael
Power eds., 2005) (arguing that organizations are the principal actors in a risk society); M.
Granger Morgan, Choosing and Managing Technology-Induced Risk, in READINGS IN RISK
17, 17 (Theodore S. Glickman & Michael Gough eds., 1990) (setting forth questions
addressing methods to assess, abate, and manage risk).
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risk objects identified during the assessment phase. A key component of
any program of risk management is to maximize the range of risk objects
that the manager has control over and to minimize the areas where the
descriptive-relational link between contingency and future states remains
hidden.16 An organization will succeed in managing risk to the extent that
it is able to improve its risk assessment capabilities and maximize the range
of risk objects over which it exerts control. Therefore, control, or at least
the perception of control, is central to risk management.
Risk managers, particularly those working at financial institutions,
might object to this characterization as too abstract and distant from their
daily practice. Although this is partly true, these broad definitions of risk
and risk management still provide a useful framework in which actual risk
management practice and regulation can be set. By adopting this
framework, it will be possible to question “the obviousness of practitioner
common sense” by individuating “the processes by which that common
sense was formed.”17 Financial risk is often conflated with volatility
alone,18 but that approach unrealistically assumes static organizational
goals and causal environments. The success of the dominant quantitative
model of risk management practice in recent decades is equivocal, so by
starting with first principles it might be possible to contemplate alternative
modes of control that could have proven more effective at risk assessment
and control.
Since the mid-1980s, commercial and regulatory developments have
combined to elevate risk management (including risk assessment) to
become a core management imperative in financial services. Of course, the
discipline of managing uncertainty is hardly a novel moment in intellectual
history. Probabilistic techniques for computing gambling odds developed
in sixteenth century Italy, for example, would qualify as proto-risk
management practices according to the broad framework outlined above.19
So too would the events marking the genesis of dedicated insurance
16. BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 197.
17. MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION 8 (1997).
18. The idea that risk refers only to the quantifiable volatility of returns originated with
Frank Knight in 1921. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 233 (1921)
(“To preserve the distinction . . . between the measurable uncertainty and an unmeasurable
one we may use the term ‘risk’ to designate the former and the term ‘uncertainty’ for the
latter.”). For a discussion on why this view is unduly restrictive, see Glyn A. Holton,
Defining Risk, 60 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 19, 20 (2004) (“According to common usage, risk
entails both uncertainty and exposure—possible consequences. Knight’s distinction
addresses only the uncertainty.”); Robert F. Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented
Stress Testing Regulation (manuscript on file with author).
19. See DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK
MANAGER 22-24 (2002) (discussing studies of gambling by Girolamo Cardano, an Italian
mathematician and physician).
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markets, including Edmund Halley’s publication of mortality data in 1693
for the purpose of accurate pricing of annuity contracts; the birth of a
casualty insurance market at Edward Lloyd’s coffee house in the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries; and the formation of the first
life insurance companies in mid-eighteenth century Scotland.20 These
insurance innovations were enabled by advances in statistical science
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that prompted confident
assertions that human intelligence would soon be able to understand the
entire universe in terms of cause and effect.21 Peter Bernstein has described
the work of early statisticians Jacob Bernoulli, Abraham de Moivre, and
Thomas Bayes as an “audacious” and “bold attack on the unknown.”22
Even as the Enlightenment’s expectations that science would uncover all
causal linkages gave way to the twentieth century’s recognition of the
irreducible complexities of phenomena, probability theory emerged
unscathed.23
Despite its historical pedigree, risk management in its contemporary
iterations seems novel due to its emergence as a subject for law and
20. See NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE
WORLD 191-96 (2008) (chronicling the development of Scottish insurance products using
mortality projections); Edmund Halley, First Life Insurance Tables, in 3 THE WORLD OF
MATHEMATICS 1437 (James R. Newman ed., 1956) [hereinafter WORLD OF MATHEMATICS
VOLUME 3] (discussing the valuation of life insurance and annuity contracts using actuarial
tables).
21. See, e.g., Pierre Simon de Laplace, Concerning Probability, in 2 THE WORLD OF
MATHEMATICS 1325, 1325-26 (James R. Newman ed., 1956) (arguing that all events are
caused and can therefore be understood). The intellectual foundation for such assertions
was laid by Jacob Bernoulli’s proof of the “law of large numbers,” which “enabled [man] at
least to ascertain a posteriori what we cannot determine a priori, that is, to ascertain it from
the results observed in numerous similar instances.” Jacob Bernoulli, The Law of Large
Numbers, in WORLD OF MATHEMATICS VOLUME 3, supra note 20, at 1452, 1453. Bernoulli’s
theory assumed that “the occurrence (or nonoccurrence) of an event in the future will follow
the same pattern as was observed for like events in the past.” Id. Abraham de Moivre
demonstrated how a set of random samples would distribute themselves around an average
value, thereby transforming Bernoulli’s assumption into a foundational premise of modern
statistics. BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 127-28. Samples, whether from past data or from
some other larger population, could be used to represent the true universe of possibilities.
See id. at 126 (describing the use of a small sample to generalize about life expectancies).
De Moivre trumpeted the confidence of this nascent statistical science: “‘altho’ Chance
produces irregularities, still the Odds will be infinitely great, that in process of Time, those
Irregularities will bear no proportion to the recurrency of that Order which naturally
results . . . .’” ANDERS HALD, A HISTORY OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS AND THEIR
APPLICATIONS BEFORE 1750 490-91 (2003) (quoting de Moivre from 1738).
22. BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 133.
23. See, e.g., Henri Poincaré, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE, in 1 SCIENCE AND
EDUCATION: A SERIES OF VOLUMES FOR THE PROMOTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND
EDUCATION PROGRESS 395 (J. McKeen Cattell ed., 1921) (discussing probability at the turn
of the twentieth century).
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regulation, as well as its formalization and systemization within corporate
and other organizational networks of authority and information. In both
government and in industry, “risk management has become more important
than ever before.”24 One commentator has gone so far as to call risk
management a “new religion.”25 Another refers to the “explosion” of risk
management.26 Still others describe risk management as a “key business
competence”27 or “the new strategic imperative in financial management.”28
The proliferation of risk management norms and regulation in recent
decades can be explained according to two alternative stories. According
to one story, referred to here as the traditional story of risk management,
risk management and risk management regulation are seen as functional,
practical responses to the challenge of managing in an increasingly volatile
operating environment.29 The other story, referred to here as the alternative
story of risk management, is more skeptical and, though it acknowledges
the empirical fact of risk management as an enhanced organizational
priority, it interrogates risk management’s normative assumptions. When
considering these contrasting stories, important points of divergence
emerge. Whether one looks optimistically to risk management and its
regulation as a managerial practice will depend on which story one finds
more convincing. The traditional story portrays risk management as a
tractable set of practices that generate information from the politicalrhetorical and descriptive-relational dimensions of risk and apply that
information to promote organizational objectives. The alternative story, by
contrast, exposes problematic assumptions with the implementation of risk
management into corporate governance infrastructure.
II.

THE TRADITIONAL STORY: RISK MANAGEMENT REGULATION
AS TOOL FOR MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL UNCERTAINTY

Among bankers and regulators, a dominant narrative describes banks
entering a new, riskier operating environment starting in the 1980s. In
response, bank regulators pursued their statutory missions—promoting the
safety and soundness of individual institutions and system-wide financial
24. James Lam, Managing Risk Across the Enterprise: Challenges and Benefits, in
RISK MANAGEMENT: A MODERN PERSPECTIVE 3, 3 (Michael K. Ong ed., 2006).
25. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 47.
26. MICHAEL POWER, THE RISK MANAGEMENT OF EVERYTHING 9 (2004), available at
http://www.demos.co.uk/files/riskmanagementofeverything.pdf.
27. SATYAJIT DAS, RISK MANAGEMENT 4 (3d ed. 2006) (emphasis omitted).
28. JAMES T. GLEASON, RISK: THE NEW MANAGEMENT IMPERATIVE IN FINANCE xvii
(2000).
29. See, e.g., POWER, supra note 26, at 37-38 (describing the new risk management
approach as a “rational response” to today’s “more risky” environment).
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stability—by harnessing advances in risk management systems being
developed by the banks themselves. According to this account, regulators
intervened intermittently into corporate governance by imposing new risk
management responsibilities on banks, often highlighting the best practices
of forward-thinking institutions. As market structures and activities
evolved and new manifestations of risk materialized—including most
prominently with respect to interest rate risk, market risk, credit risk, and
operational risk—regulators responded by requiring banks to update their
risk management systems to control the threats posed by such risks. This
traditional story depicts a logic of control characterized by a dynamic game
of threat identification and response. This story can be traced throughout
the 1980s into the 2000s in the bank regulatory actions discussed below.
The increasing emphasis by regulators on shaping internal risk
management norms recalls what Cary Coglianese and David Lazer label
management-based regulation (MBR). MBR describes the process by
which public administrators direct regulated organizations to engage in a
planning process that aims to achieve public goals, while offering industry
flexibility concerning the operational details for the achievement of those
goals.30 The authors argue that MBR is appropriate where regulated
entities are heterogeneous and regulatory outputs are difficult to monitor.31
Regulated institutions with heterogeneous circumstances are not
appropriate candidates for what the authors call “technology-based”32
regulatory approaches; such approaches specify techniques, procedures,
restrictions to be used in regulation, and are commonly referred to as
command-and-control regulations.33 The use of rigid “[t]op-down, controloriented logic is ill-suited to the dynamism of risk in a knowledge society,
which resists containment and instead demands active management.”34
Conversely, where critical external outputs are difficult to monitor,
“performance-based” regulatory regimes designed to intervene at the
output stage (the classic example being pollution taxes set at the optimal
amount required to offset the incentive to pollute35) are unlikely to result in
30. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & POL’Y 691, 693-96 (2003)
(describing the goals of MBR, as well as its criteria, advantages, and implementation).

31. Id.
32. Id. at 701.
33. Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633,
656-63 (2012).
34. Susan V. Scott & Geoff Walsham, Reconceptualizing and Managing Reputation
Risk in the Knowledge Economy: Toward Reputable Action, 16 ORG. SCI. 308, 310 (2005).
35. See Martin Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUDIES 477, 477
(1974) (discussing the debate between controlling pollution through emissions standards or
taxes).
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efficient administration.36
Exploration with MBR approaches in the banking sector is hardly
surprising. With its institution-specific, idiosyncratic, and hard-to-monitor
risk profiles, the banking industry is a natural candidate for regulation. By
influencing the way in which risk is conceived, deliberated, and acted on
within a bank, regulators could preserve context-specificity and
simultaneously elude the thorny epistemic problem of how to monitor
excessive risk on an ongoing basis. Regulators adopting an MBR approach
would intervene at the planning stage, helping and overseeing the regulated
institution as it deliberates on how to promote regulatory objectives.37
Whether regulators have had success in their MBR approaches is
discussed below, but the Coglianese-Lazer model provides a useful lens
through which to consider risk management as a subject of bank regulation.
Other regulatory scholars have developed similar notions, such as “meta
risk management,”38 “meta-monitoring,”39 “meta-regulation,”40 “directly
deliberative polyarchy,”41 and “responsive regulation.”42 These models of
regulation aim to reorient regulatory practice in light of the limits of state
power to regulate in decentralized, dynamic, volatile, and at times even
authentically complex,43 realms of human activity. They are characterized,
somewhat counter-intuitively, both by the devolution of discretion to
industry and enhanced pretensions of control. Regulation works on the
systems and procedures through which corporate authority results in
corporate activity. Regulators use public power to “push control further
into organizational structures, inscribing it within systems which can then
36. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 30, at 701-02.
37. Id. at 694, 706.
38. John Braithwaite, Meta Risk Management and Responsive Regulation for Tax
System Integrity, 25 LAW & POL’Y 1, 1 (2003) (“Meta risk management is a promising
strategy when risks are volatile and difficult for the regulator to comprehend when the risks
are effectively under the control of an organization over which the regulator has leverage.”).
39. Peter N. Grabosky, Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory
Compliance, 8 GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L J. OF POL’Y & ADMIN. 527, 543 (1995).
40. CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: SELF-REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY
15 (2002).
41. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288 (1998) (emphasis omitted).
42. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 1 (1992)
(introducing responsive regulation and distinguishing it from other regulation strategies
“both in what triggers a regulatory response and what the regulatory response will be”); see
also Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation, 71 MOD. L. REV. 59, 69
(2008) (advocating a responsive regulation that responds “not merely to firms’ compliance
responses but also to their attitudinal settings[,] to the broader institutional environment of
the regulatory regime”).
43. On the complexity of contemporary financial markets, see Robert F. Weber,
Structural Regulation as Antidote to Complexity Capture, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 643 (2012).
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be audited.”44 The traditional story relies on these models of regulation and
their sequential logic of threat perception and flexible regulatory response.
A. The Risk Management Revolution and the Derivatives Revolution
The traditional story must begin, for both conceptual and historical
reasons, with an overview of the derivatives revolution that commenced in
the 1980s.45 A derivative is a financial contract whose value depends on
the values of one or more underlying assets, indexes, or reference rates.46
Although some derivatives can be extremely complicated, all of them can
be divided into two broad categories: options and forward contracts.47
Derivatives are either standardized contracts executed on exchanges (i.e.,
“exchange-traded”) or custom-tailored, negotiated transactions (i.e., overthe counter, or “OTC”).48
Though many factors are responsible for fueling the derivatives boom,
one principal motivating force was the need to hedge against an
increasingly risky business environment.49 The collapse of the Bretton
Woods system of managed exchange rates in the early 1970s augured a
secular shift in the risk profile of the banking business. This, along with
other threats to financial markets during the 1960s and 1970s, led banks to
hedge against these risks by creating a “new breed of securities,” including
currency futures and options and interest rate swaps.50
44. POWER, supra note 17, at 42.
45. The opening paragraph of the introduction to a text on financial risk management
illustrates the centrality of derivatives: “The development of derivative instruments has
emerged as perhaps the most significant aspect of capital markets in the last 20 years.
Exchange-traded and over-the-counter derivatives have radically altered the practice of
borrowing, investment and risk management.” DAS, supra note 27, at ix. Moreover, the
author notes, “[t]he increased emphasis on risk management has seen a parallel process of
establishing a series of practice benchmarks. The central driver was the growth in
derivatives activity.” Id. at 12.
46. GROUP OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 26 (1993) [hereinafter
PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES].
47. Id. at 27; BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, RISK MANAGEMENT
GUIDELINES FOR DERIVATIVES 2 (1994), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc211.pdf
[hereinafter BASEL RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES].
48. PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 46.
49. Other uses of derivatives unrelated to risk reduction include lowering funding
costs, diversifying funding sources, and enhancing returns by exploiting arbitrage
opportunities. Id. at 26, 32-40.
50. MICHEL CROUHY ET AL., RISK MANAGEMENT xix (2001); see also RAFFAELE
SCALCIONE, THE DERIVATIVES REVOLUTION 18 (2010) (recommending four steps to
strengthen the regulation of over-the-counter derivatives); GLEASON, supra note 28, at 28
(discussing tools and techniques used to measure and manage hedging risks). Other
accounts trace the genesis of modern currency and interest rate swaps to back-to-back loan
transactions, which were popularized in the 1970s for avoiding capital controls rather than
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Furthermore, the deregulatory climate of the 1970s and 1980s opened
up inter-sectoral competition among banks, securities firms, insurance
companies, and mutual funds. The Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), which
has supervisory responsibility over bank holding companies, permitted
banks to establish affiliates to underwrite and deal in securities otherwise
off-limits to the banks themselves, including equities and bonds. As a
result of these activities, banks became subject to heightened market risk—
that is, the risk that the market price of an asset or liability may change
over a given time period because of economic changes or other events.51
Starting in the mid-1980s, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), the lead regulator of the largest U.S. banks, gradually and
deliberately empowered banks to become dealers in OTC derivatives.52
Though the expansive definition of “commodity” in the Commodity
Exchange Act (CEA) could be read to subject many OTC derivatives to
federal regulation, Congress and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) accepted the banks’ position that privately-negotiated
OTC derivatives should be unregulated.53 The market expanded from
hedging and risk management purposes. JOHN F. MARSHALL & KENNETH R. KAPNER,
UNDERSTANDING SWAPS 2-5 (1993). Such discussions acknowledge, however, that
whatever the precedent model transactions that gave rise to early swaps, the foreign
exchange and interest rate volatility of the 1980s caused the market to grow rapidly. Id. at
6.
51. Jorge R. Sobehart & Sean C. Keenan, New Challenges in Credit Risk Modeling and
Measurement, in RISK MANAGEMENT: A MODERN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 24, at 203, 208.
52. Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the
“Business of Banking”, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009).
53. See Trading in Foreign Currencies for Future Delivery, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,983,
42,985 (Oct. 23, 1985) (discussing the various types of instruments that will remain
unregulated); Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (Jul. 1,
1989) (providing a safe harbor from CFTC regulation for OTC swap transactions meeting
specified requirements). Banks were unsatisfied by the CFTC’s 1989 policy statement,
perceiving in it a latent legal risk that the CFTC could later withhold the safe harbor, and
therefore lobbied in favor of a comprehensive statutory exemption. The banks’ confusion
stemmed from the seeming incongruence between the 1989 policy statement and the socalled Treasury Amendment to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974,
which exempted OTC “trading in foreign currency,” among other transactions, from the
CEA altogether. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,985; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMODITY
EXCHANGE ACT: ISSUES RELATED TO THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC TRADING SYSTEMS 8
(2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/229069.pdf (noting that the Treasury
Amendment operated on the assumption that bank regulators, rather than the SEC or CFTC,
would supervise OTC derivatives markets); GORDON F. PEERY, THE POST-REFORM GUIDE TO
DERIVATIVES AND FUTURES 272 (2012) (noting the conflicting interpretations). The
Treasury Amendment was proposed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in recognition
of the prevalence of financially knowledgeable institutional investors in the foreign
exchange futures markets. See Trading in Foreign Currencies for Future Delivery, 50 Fed.
Reg. at 42,983-85 (Oct. 23, 1985) (CFTC) (distinguishing sales to the general public from
those made to institutional investors). In October 1992, Congress provided the CFTC with
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“vanilla” interest rate and currency swaps to “derivatives linked to credit
risk, currency convertibility risk, equity risk, macro-economic indicia
(including inflation and unemployment rates), market access risk, and
volatility and weather risk, as well as derivatives replicating both real estate
investments and the dynamic portfolios of securities and derivatives.”54 A
wave of consolidation in the banking industry, coupled with the increased
diversification into other business lines, created financial institutions that
were larger in asset size and wider in scope than ever before. With size
came new operational risks, as business units became subject to risk of
automated systems failures and human errors or frauds across a wider array
of affiliated businesses.55
But the derivatives revolution carried with it a paradox: the increases
in the number and trading volume of new derivatives instruments remedied
existing risks while they created new ones. This paradox is best understood
by comparing the view of derivatives from a portfolio-specific perspective
to an institution-wide perspective. Banks and other businesses found
themselves facing new manifestations of credit, market, interest rate,
liquidity, and operational risks. Derivatives allowed them to hedge their
exposures.56 Derivatives are, like insurance, inherently capable of
functioning as risk reduction instruments; they are contracts between a
party that is paid to assume certain risks and a counterparty that buys
protection against that risk.57 A summary of risk management in The
Oxford Handbook of Banking defines risk management as the discipline of
offsetting exposures through the use of derivatives.58 Such a definition is
authority to exempt certain classes of OTC derivatives from regulation under the CEA.
Futures Trading Practices Act, Pub. L. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992) (repealed 2000). The
Act also invoked federal preemption to exempt most OTC derivative transactions from the
scope of state anti-gambling laws, which facially seemed to prohibit such transactions.
Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial
Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1654-55 (2008). Three months later, the
CFTC exempted OTC swaps from the CEA. Exemption of Certain Swap Agreements, 58
Fed. Reg. 5587 (Jan. 22, 1993) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (2012)).
54. Paul Ali, Corporate Governance and Derivatives End Users, in PRACTICAL
DERIVATIVES 9, 9 (Carolyn Boyle et al. eds., 2d ed., 2010).
55. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has provided a very general but
influential definition of operational risk as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or
failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events.” BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND
CAPITAL STANDARDS 144 (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm
[hereinafter BASEL II FRAMEWORK].
56. See Linda Allen & Anthony Saunders, Risk Management in Banking, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 99 (Allen N. Berger et al. eds., 2010) (describing
derivative markets as “the thermostat used by the bank to control its risk temperature”).
57. See PEERY, supra note 53, at 3 (comparing derivatives to insurance contracts).
58. Allen & Saunders, supra note 56, at 90.
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too narrow, but it underscores the centrality of derivatives to any account of
the heightened concern for risk management. From a portfolio-specific
perspective, then, a derivative transforms a given risk exposure for the
portfolio into a credit risk exposure against the derivative counterparty.
Where that credit exposure is less risky than the risk against that which the
derivative protects—which is nearly always the case—the derivative
reduces the total amount of risk faced by the exposed entity.59
Unlike insurance purchasers, however, which are only empowered to
obtain insurance against exposures in which they possess an insurable
interest, an OTC derivatives trader is unrestrained as a contractual matter in
the amount of exposure it can create.60 The derivatives trader’s only
constraints are the ingenuity of parties drafting derivatives contracts and
the continued willingness of counterparties to accept the terms of the
contract. Thus, there is theoretically no limit to the amounts of exposure a
bank can create, either entrepreneurially or unwittingly.61
In the early years of OTC derivatives, banks acted as brokers between
two counterparties desiring to take opposite sides of a trade.62 But banks
gradually began acting as parties in the transactions, developing their own
portfolios of derivatives. The accumulation of proprietary positions in
derivatives required dealer banks to confront a new challenge: how to
manage the net risk of its overall position. As a result of the transition
from brokering transactions to maintaining portfolios, trade volume
skyrocketed and the dimensionality of institution-specific risk increased by
orders of magnitude.63 Regulators such as Alan Greenspan, then Chairman
59. For this statement to be true in all circumstances, we would also need to verify that
the bank was not, by accepting a credit exposure, incurring other unforeseen exposures. See
JOHN C. HULL, RISK MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 55-76 (2007) (describing
how traders hedge risk exposures with derivatives).
60. Absent an insurable interest on the part of the insured, an insurance contract is void
as a wagering contract. See LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, 3 COUCH ON INSURANCE §
41:1 (3d ed. 2009) (defining insurable interest). Conversely, a derivatives dealer,
unencumbered by the insurable interest requirement, faces no limits, at least as a matter of
contract and insurance law, in its ability to wager.
61. In the case of an option contract, which is a basic type of derivative, the writer of a
single option is exposed to the possibility of (a theoretic) unlimited loss if its exposure
remains un-hedged. See BASEL COMM. BANKING SUPERVISION, THE MANAGEMENT OF
BANKS’
OFF-BALANCE
SHEET
EXPOSURES
5
(1986),
available
at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc134.pdf [hereinafter MANAGEMENT OF OFF-BALANCE SHEET
EXPOSURES].
62. See PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 39-40 (discussing the financial
goals motivating trades for each party). For example, Party A might want to hedge against
fuel price inflation and Party B might want to speculate that fuel prices will decrease. Party
A and Party B would then contact Bank, a known derivatives dealer, who would match
Party A and Party B and document the trade for a fee.
63. By 1996, derivatives had evolved from obscure risk management devices to

WEBER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1022

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/21/2013 4:53 PM

[Vol. 15:4

of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, viewed the
expansion in trading volumes of derivatives with equanimity, convinced
that banks were incurring new exposures precisely because of an enhanced
ability to manage risk.64
Other regulators were less confident. While the Basel Committee
recognized that the “basic risks associated with derivatives transactions are
not new to banking organizations[,]”65 it remained mindful that the basic
risks could be “repackage[d] . . . in combinations that can be quite
complex,” in the process “threaten[ing] the safety and soundness of
institutions if they are not clearly understood and properly managed.”66 By
the mid-1990s, however, regulators began to recognize problems deeper
than the institution-specific safety and soundness concerns. In particular,
the failure of a single large derivatives dealer could “cause liquidity
problems in the markets and could also pose risks to others, including
federally insured banks and the financial system as a whole.”67 In the
words of a Bank for International Settlements official in 1995, the
vulnerability of banks had increased markedly, requiring regulators “to
anticipate new sources of change,” while at the same time recognizing that
they “will not always be successful.”68
During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. lawmakers, courts, and regulators
sought to preserve the productive advantages of the new generation of
derivative instruments and other financial innovations, while at the same
time indirectly encouraging the use of risk management techniques among
financial institutions dealing in derivatives markets. The new risk
comprise a market twice the size of the U.S. stock market and more than ten times the total
U.S. sovereign debt. FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O. STREET 15 (1997).
64. See Testimony by Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. & Fin. of the U.S. H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 103d Cong. 26 (1994) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of the
Governors
of
the
Federal
Reserve
System),
available
at
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/805/download/27981/Greenspan-19940525.pdf (“It
is important to recognize that significant advances in the management of market and credit
risks, including improvements both in financial methodology and in the design of
management information systems, lie behind the recent surge in derivatives activity.”).
65. BASEL RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 3. See PRACTICES AND
PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 2 (“Derivatives help to manage risk in new ways—an
important economic function. Yet the risks involved in derivatives activities are neither new
nor unique. They are the same kinds of risks found in traditional financial products:
market, credit, legal, and operational risks.”).
66. BASEL RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 3 .
67. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO
PROTECT
THE
FINANCIAL
SYSTEM
7
(1994),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/154342.pdf [hereinafter GAO DERIVATIVES REPORT].
68. Andrew Crockett, Speech Before the Swiss Bankers Association, Sept. 27, 1995
in DMITRIS CHORAFAS, RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 9 (2007).
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environment changed the nature of the banking business and regulation.
As described by FRB Governor Dan Tarullo:
Gone were the days when a bank CEO had a hands-on sense
of the risks entailed in even a large bank’s significant
operations—mortgage, consumer, corporate, etc. With the
growth in off-balance-sheet activities [such as derivatives], the
explosion of creative securitization and other financial
innovations, and the erosion of barriers between commercial
banking and other financial activities, even the most diligent
senior management was inevitably unaware of the nature and
scope of at least some significant risks.69
This “inevitable unawareness” of bank management—along with the
concomitant recognition that regulators were even further removed from
meaningful risk awareness—motivated regulators to think creatively about
facilitating solutions to the challenge of managing uncertainty.
Crucially, however, regulators stopped short of expressly prescribing
the content that risk management obligations entail, instead preferring that
the industry develop its own risk management practices and infrastructure.
This phenomenon is not limited to finance. Public law authorities have
made broad-based risk management interventions into the corporate
governance of non-financial firms as well. These efforts in the nonfinancial context have consisted predominantly of requiring firms to
monitor internal controls over financial reporting and legal compliance—a
narrow, compliance-oriented risk management. These internal control
measures constitute a subset of risk management relating to legal and
accounting risks that form part of the broader constellation of risk
management tools.70 In recognition of the potential risks of instability
inherent in derivatives markets, legislative and regulatory initiatives in the
financial arena have gone beyond compliance-oriented risk management to
foster a broad, comprehensive risk management, through the use of express
directives to constitute—and over time, reinforce—a risk management
function within the firm that is responsible for assessing all risks.
B. Origins of Risk-Management as Compliance-Oriented Internal
Control
This article focuses on risk management systems at financial
institutions. Though the derivatives discussion above highlights why risk
69. DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION 175 (2008).
70. See OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6 (warning that
internal controls are insufficient to cover the entire range of enterprise risk management).
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management became a new managerial imperative in the finance industry
in the 1980s and 1990s, risk management attracted the attention of
lawmakers, courts, and regulators in other contexts as well. During the
same period, public law authorities perceived that the task of managing
large-scale, often multinational, enterprises required new organizational
responses to risks.71 These authorities responded by intervening into
corporate governance, usually by addressing the adequacy of internal
controls over financial reporting and legal compliance rather than risk
itself. Internal controls are those processes designed to ensure that an
organization has in place an organizational behavior corresponding to a
particular risk and a control to ensure that the behavior is both being
applied and working as intended.72 A system of internal controls, if
designed effectively, can provide reasonable assurance that an organization
performs reliably, in accordance with its policies, and in pursuit of its
objectives.73 The concept of compliance—i.e., with laws, with accounting
rules, or more broadly, with firm-wide organizational policies or
objectives—is at the heart of internal control systems.74 In recognition of
the heterogeneity of organizational settings, these legal authorities have
generally left the operationalization and elaboration of internal controls to
industry itself, stopping short of expressly prescribing any particular
format. As applied to banks, these legal responses operated as a sort of
background, default mandatory regime governing the monitoring and
control of a class of uncertain events, and also as a comparison point for the
more expansive systems of risk control, to be discussed later in Sub-Parts
II.C and II.D, that regulators imposed on banks.
Judicial intervention in this area has taken the form of an expansive
gloss on the common law fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.75 A basic

71. See Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and
Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 571 (2008) (highlighting some of the risks
faced by large multinational enterprises).
72. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR ENHANCING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 17 (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs176.pdf.
73. See, e.g., Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Report on Internal
Control Over Financial Reporting Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,324, 35,336 (Jun. 27, 2007) (discussing internal controls); see
also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNAL CONTROL
SYSTEMS
IN
BANKING
ORGANIZATIONS
1
(1998),
available
at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs40.pdf (emphasizing the importance of internal controls for a
bank).
74. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L. R. 487 (2003) (summarizing and skeptically
assessing the legal treatment of the compliance function).
75. Whether the failure-to-monitor claim alleges a breach of the duty of loyalty or the
duty of care does not impact the application of the business judgment rule, though if the
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precept of corporate law is that a board of directors has the primary
responsibility for overseeing the business and affairs of a corporation.76 In
exercising this responsibility, the board is subject to a duty of loyalty and a
duty of care.77 During the past two decades, courts, perhaps due in part to
the increasing complexity of firm-specific risk profiles, have interpreted
these duties to include a responsibility to ensure that a firm has adequate
monitoring and reporting systems, though they have stopped short of
expressly requiring any particular form of risk management system. For
example, the Delaware Chancery Court famously stated in In re Caremark
International Derivative Litigation that a corporate board of directors’
duties include ensuring that an adequate “corporate information and
reporting system” is in place to provide management with “timely, accurate
information.”78 Ten years later, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized in
Stone v. Ritter the validity of a Caremark failure-to-monitor claim, but
limited the scope of the claim to instances where the board demonstrates a
“conscious disregard” for its duty to provide for a corporate information
infrastructure.79 Only where a board of directors “utterly fail[s] to
implement any reporting or information system or controls” will a violation
of the duty of care be found.80 Both Caremark and Stone focused on the
critical role that information flow plays in reducing the risk of unlawful
activity—a risk for which minimal, if not zero, tolerance is given.81
claim is framed as a breach of the former duty, the defendant directors will not be able to
avail themselves of a section 102(b)(7) exculpatory clause. See Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 967, 975 (2009)
(discussing the care executives must take in their duties to monitor).
76. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2009) (“The business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of
a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate
of incorporation.”).
77. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006) (discussing the doctrinal
boundaries of the board’s duties of loyalty and care).
78. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litg., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Caremark was before the Chancery Court for judicial approval of a settlement agreed to by
the parties, so the portions of Chancellor Allen’s opinion concerning the duty to monitor are
technically dicta. Nevertheless, the duty-to-monitor analysis has “morphed into what has
come to be known as a Caremark claim” in both federal and state courts both within and
outside of Delaware. Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance Survey, 64 BUS. LAW. 253,
272 (2008).
79. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70. In Caremark, Chancellor Allen warned that a failureto-monitor claim was “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a
plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.” Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. In Stone, the Supreme
Court quoted his observation approvingly. Stone, 911 A.2d at 372.
80. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (emphasis added).
81. Although risk management and legal compliance (including internal controls over
financial reporting) are not different in kind, they are different in degree, inasmuch as
boards are expected to establish some tolerance for risk taking (unlike law-breaking). See
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In 2008, plaintiffs brought a novel failure-to-monitor claim against
Citigroup Inc., alleging that the board of directors failed to monitor and
oversee risks associated with the housing market in the lead up to the most
recent financial crisis.82 Plaintiffs did not, however, allege breaches of the
law or financial statement inaccuracies.83 In this case, the Delaware
Chancery Court refused to allow a Caremark claim against Citigroup
directors to proceed.84 The Court observed that plaintiffs’ claims differed
from traditional Caremark claims in that plaintiffs allegedly “fail[ed] to
properly monitor Citigroup’s business risk, specifically its exposure to the
subprime mortgage market.”85 The court emphasized the relevance of the
business judgment rule—i.e., that good faith business decisions are not
challengeable in court unless plaintiffs can prove a violation of the board’s
duties of care and loyalty—even in the context of a Caremark-style failureto-monitor claim. In the end, the plaintiffs did not plead with adequate
specificity how the oversight mechanisms instated by the board to monitor
business risk were inadequate.86 Plaintiffs’ case was no doubt handicapped
by their acknowledgement that Citigroup had created an audit and risk
management committee of the board that met twenty-three times through
2006 and 2007.87 Notably, however, the Chancery Court clarified that
oversight responsibilities described in Caremark were not limited to
internal control over financial reporting and legal compliance, stating that
“it may be possible for a plaintiff to meet the [Caremark] burden under
some [different] set of facts” in a suit alleging failure to monitor business
risk.88 Though Citigroup applies some pressure on boards to oversee the
implementation of risk management systems, the Delaware Supreme
Court’s imposition of the “conscious disregard” requirement in Stone
seems to afford a board wide discretion.
Congress and regulators also focused on internal controls during this
period in the banking industry and elsewhere. Such efforts adopt a
management-based regulatory model under which the abstract systems of
internal control over risks, rather than the risk outputs themselves, became
the regulated subject.89 Though the external audit as a mode of assurance

Bainbridge, supra note 76, at 982-84.
82. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 112.
85. Id. at 123.
86. Id. at 128.
87. Id. at 127.
88. Id. at 126.
89. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text (explaining the features of
management-based regulation).
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provision had been around for centuries,90 a heightened emphasis on
internal control represented a new control logic that focused on the system
rather than the reliability of individual acts.91 Internal controls assumed
increasing importance in the accounting profession as businesses became
more complicated, particularly with international expansion.92 Businesses
with strong internal controls over accounting would require a lower degree
of external verification for their accounts.
The first public law foray into internal control dates to the mid-1970s
when Congress, responding to a series of corporate bribery scandals,
enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).93 The FCPA aimed to
redress a new perceived threat: bribery and corruption by U.S. firms with
global operations. Recognizing that Congress lacked the expertise to
prescribe standards for how to organize control over firm assets and that
U.S. regulators lacked the enforcement resources to police business units in
far-flung corners of a globalized economy, the FCPA requires firms,
among other things, to have in place “a system of internal accounting
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances” that access to and use
of corporate assets occur only with proper authorization and that
transactions are properly recorded.94
Congress took the internal controls mandate a step further in the
banking context by requiring specific attestations from management.
Following the savings and loan debacle of the late 1980s, Congress enacted
a sweeping reform of federal banking regulation with the Federal Deposit
90. See, e.g., DEREK MATTHEWS, A HISTORY OF AUDITING: THE CHANGING AUDIT
PROCESS IN BRITAIN FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT DAY 6 (2006)
(recounting how landlords in Medieval Europe employed auditors to provide anti-fraud
assurance with respect to stewards’ accounts).
91. See POWER, supra note 17, at 20 (describing a shift to internal control testing by
auditing practitioners in the 1930s); cf. id. at 88 (“Audits become possible in complex
environments by abstracting from that complexity and by operating upon a systems surface
which in some cases has been designed with auditability in mind.”).
92. Michael Power ascribes the preference for internal control over direct audit in
terms of cost reduction. See id. at 82 (“Even though economic pressures may have driven
auditors to reduce the volume of their transactions work, the idea of reliance on auditee
controls is fundamentally plausible: if one can have confidence that a system exists to
control the completeness, accuracy and validity of transactions between an organization and
its environment, then it is unnecessary to duplicate this work and look at the transactions in
detail.”).
93. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 558-59 (6th ed. 2009)
(discussing the scandals that preceded the FCPA’s enactment).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2006). The FCPA also prohibited the making of most
payments to foreign officials and their representatives for purposes of making or retaining
business. Id. § 78dd-1(a). As such, the FCPA employs a hybrid regulatory approach
utilizing MBR and PBR. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of
those approaches.
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Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). Among other
things, FDICIA required a bank’s CEO and chief accounting or financial
officer to sign statements acknowledging their responsibility for
“establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure” and
maintaining compliance with regulations regarding the safety and
soundness of their banks.95 The same executives also were required to
attest to the effectiveness of the internal control environment.96 FDICIA
also required federal bank regulators to establish certain safety and
soundness standards for FDIC-insured banks, including with respect to
internal controls and information systems.97 These standards would be
evaluated during bank examinations.
Shortly thereafter, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO),98 a consortium of the major accounting
professional associations, published the first comprehensive guide to the
internal control function.99 The non-binding COSO internal controls
framework defined internal control as a “process, effected by an entity’s
board of directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement” of certain specified types
of organizational objectives.100 Importantly, the framework identified not
only the traditional internal control objects—i.e., compliance with law and
financial reporting reliability—but also “effectiveness and efficiency of
operations.”101 According to the COSO framework, a system of internal
controls could be designed to promote any of an entity’s business
objectives, “including performance and profitability goals and safeguarding
of resources.”102 This marks a point of departure in the internal control
literature and recalls the political-rhetorical dimension of risk.103 COSO
addressed the descriptive-relational dimension of risk as well, including
risk assessment and ongoing risk monitoring as two of the five pillars of a

95. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, § 36(b), Pub. L.
102-242, 105 Stat. 2242 (1991) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831m(b)).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 39 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §1831p-1).
98. The organizational name for the Treadway Commission was the National
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Founded in 1985 by COSO, it took its
name from James C. Treadway, Jr., its initial chairman and former commissioner of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.
99. COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, INTERNAL CONTROL—
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK (1992), available at http://www.coso.org/ic-integratedframeworksummary.htm [hereinafter COSO INTERNAL CONTROLS FRAMEWORK].
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See supra note 13 and accompanying text for a discussion of that dimension.
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system of internal control.104 With the COSO framework, the internal
controls discourse had evolved into an intellectual framework for risk
identification, assessment, and monitoring, albeit manifested only in the
private sector trade standards and not yet as a matter of public law in any
meaningful sense.105
Around the same time, a series of corporate scandals in the United
Kingdom prompted the London Stock Exchange, the financial accounting
firms, and the Financial Reporting Council, a U.K. regulator charged with
promoting corporate governance and reporting norms, to establish a
committee to make recommendations concerning financial aspects of
corporate governance in the United Kingdom. The committee published
the “Cadbury Report,” which stressed that boards of directors “maintain a
system of internal control over the financial management of the company”
and recommended that boards “make a statement,” to be “report[ed]
thereon” by external auditors, regarding the effectiveness of the firm’s
internal controls.106 It was more modest than the COSO framework, likely
because it carried the force of law.107 Seven years later, U.K. accounting
authorities published the Turnbull Report, which provided guidance
concerning the suggestions set forth in the Cadbury Report.108 The
Turnbull Report highlights the conceptual inter-linkages between the
management of compliance and information under the internal control
rubric and risk management.109 Particular attention was paid to allocation
of responsibility: boards were to deliberate on risk tolerances, assessments,
and limits; and management was responsible for designing, operating, and
monitoring control systems that implement board policy. The system of
104. COSO Internal Controls Framework, supra note 100. The other components
included the control environment, control activities, and information-and-communication.
Id.
105. When bank regulators began to focus more extensively on risk management, the
COSO internal controls framework became a reference point.
106. REP. OF THE COMM. ON THE FIN. ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ¶¶ 4.31–
4.32 (1992), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf.
107. The Cadbury Report recommendations were integrated into the U.K.’s corporate
governance code, by which firms listed on the London Stock Exchange were bound. By
contrast, the COSO framework was designedly aspirational.
108. The Cadbury Report was widely viewed as a portal through which risk
management issues, more explicitly developed in the Turnbull Report, became part of
enterprise control norms. See Alnoor Bhimani, Risk Management, Corporate Governance
and Management Accounting: Emerging Interdependencies, 20 MGMT. ACCT. RES. 2, 2
(2009) (explaining that the Cadbury Report opened the door for enterprise control practices
to include risk management).
109. See INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENGLAND & WALES, INTERNAL
CONTROL: GUIDANCE FOR DIRECTORS ON THE COMBINED CODE ¶¶ 16-24 (1999), available at
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/turnbul.pdf (emphasizing the importance of reporting
and information flow in its internal control objectives).
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internal control should cover not only risk of non-compliance with law or
unreliable financial reporting, but also such additional “significant
business, operational, financial, compliance and other risks.”110 For this
reason, the Turnbull Report has been described as “eviden[ce]” of the
“COSO legacy” of risk-based internal control.111
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in response to a series of
large accounting scandals at major U.S. companies, imposed a FDICIAlike mandate on all reporting companies subject to SEC periodic disclosure
requirements. Specifically, Congress required these firms in section 404 (i)
to certify the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting112
and (ii) to arrange for their auditor to attest to such certifications.113
Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted nearly ten years after the
COSO internal controls framework had been published, its application to
financial reporting alone, rather than risk more generally, limited its
scope.114 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act further required the U.S. Sentencing
Commission (USSC) to review and amend, as appropriate, the sentencing
guidelines and related policy statements to ensure that the guidelines were
“sufficient to deter and punish organizational criminal misconduct.”115 In
performing that charge, the USSC amended the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines (OSG) in 2004 to provide for sentence reductions for defendant
organizations that have implemented an “effective compliance and ethics
program,”116 defined to incorporate board- and executive-level oversight,
periodic re-assessment of legal risks, and communication to employees.117
The 2004 OSG amendments expanded on a series of earlier 1991 OSG
amendments that provided incentives for corporations to implement legal
compliance programs.118
110. Id. ¶ 20.
111. POWER, supra note 26, at 26.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2006).
113. Id. § 7262(b).
114. This is not to suggest that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a whole was not significant.
From the perspective of the senior executives and board members incurring potential civil
and criminal liability in connection with their attestations concerning the effectiveness of
internal controls over financial reporting, the Act effectuated a sea change in corporate
governance. In 2012, Congress exempted a large class of issuers, known as “emerging
growth compan[ies,]” from the requirements of section 404. Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act, H.R. 3606, § 103 (2012).
115. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 805(a)(5), 116 Stat. 745, 802
(2002).
116. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f)(1) (2010).
117. Id. § 8B2.1(b).
118. See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model To Encourage
Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1107, 1134 n.125 (discussing amendments
to the Sentencing Guidelines); Krawiec, supra note 74, at 497-98 (acknowledging that the
OSG amendments, “[f]or all practical purposes, . . . require companies to adopt internal
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C. Toward a Broader, More Comprehensive Risk Management
This sub-Part explains how bank regulators have sought to fulfill their
mandate to monitor and protect the safety and soundness of banks, as well
as the stability of the financial sector, by encouraging banks to develop an
internal risk management infrastructure.119
These regulatory
pronouncements took the form of guidance provided to banks and their
examiners to be taken into account during the bank examination process, as
well as more general guidance concerning the definitions of what
constitutes an unsafe or unsound banking practice. The guidance would
therefore serve as the basis for an enforcement action. Regulators saw risk
management as a managerial antidote designed to control the instabilities
engendered by the dizzying changes in the business of banking. In
particular, regulators focused on the expansion of derivatives and securities
activities, which they saw as requiring a new forward-looking risk
management function beyond traditional internal control’s focus on reliable
compliance.120 The previous sub-Part describes the process by which
internal control, initially a technical and limited discipline designed to
provide assurance with respect to legal compliance and financial reporting,
began to be interpreted as a more comprehensive set of managerial
responsibilities associated with risk control more generally. Bank
regulators proved themselves innovators during this period as they
attempted to influence the norms and techniques by which banks managed
potential exposures, vulnerabilities, and opportunities.
By 2006, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors Ben
Bernanke would characterize “[regulators’] assessment of the quality of a
bank’s procedures for evaluating, monitoring, and managing risk, and of
the bank’s internal models for determining economic capital” as the “heart
of the modern bank examination.”121 In 2008, Dan Tarullo noted that
because the “risks associated with the complexity and pace of large bank
activities cannot be effectively contained even with sophisticated rules . . . .
the emphasis increasingly has been on fostering robust risk management
systems within the banks themselves.”122 Where, in other words, a review
compliance structures”).
119. For a summary of bank regulatory responsibilities with respect to safety-andsoundness and financial stability, see Weber, supra note 43, at 662-65.
120. See Crockett, supra note 68, at xi (presenting risk management as the “management
of change”). Chorafas identifies technology, innovation, globalization, and deregulation as
the predominant changes in financial services since the 1970s and 1980s. Id. at 8.
121. Bernanke Stonier School Remarks, supra note 2.
122. TARULLO, supra note 69, at 274; see also Bank Holding Company Rating System,
69 Fed. Reg. 70,444, 70,444 (Dec. 6, 2004) (“[A]s the banking industry has continued to
evolve over the past decade, the focus of the Federal Reserve’s examination program for
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of balance sheets and compliance with the law no longer assured a bank’s
safety and soundness, the internal system of corporate operating practices
and systems that could give rise to vulnerabilities emerged as a critical
regulatory object.123 In 2010, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), which is responsible for examining state banks that are not
members of the Federal Reserve System, took account of this new
institutional focus in its own organizational structure when it renamed its
examination office the Division of Risk Management Supervision.124
The discussion below chronicles the emergence and evolution of risk
management as a legal-regulatory subject during the 1980s and 1990s. A
heightened awareness of financial risks, on account of rate volatility and
“innovation” in derivatives markets, motivated bank regulators to adopt
increasingly sweeping visions of risk management responsibilities of bank
boards and managers. Bank regulators communicated their vision by
publishing a rapid succession of supervisory letters, circulars, policy
statements, bulletins, as well as rules and regulations subject to full noticeand-comment rulemaking procedures. As a result, the policy positions
expressed in these regulatory pronouncements became part of the
examination and rating process, as examiners would evaluate and discuss at
length with bank management risk management practices in light of
regulatory guidance.125
bank holding companies has increasingly centered on a comprehensive review of financial
risk and the adequacy of risk management.”); CROUHY ET AL., supra note 50, at 21 (writing
in 2001 that “the role of regulators has begun to shift to that of monitoring sophisticated
banks’ internal risk management systems”).
123. See BD. GOVS. FED. RES. SYS., SR 95-51 (SUP), RATING THE ADEQUACY OF RISK
MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AND INTERNAL CONTROLS AT STATE MEMBER BANKS AND BANK
HOLDING
COMPANIES
(1995),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1995/sr9551.htm
[hereinafter
FRB
GUIDELINES FOR RATING RISK MANAGEMENT] (asserting that “specific rating of risk
management and internal controls should be given significant weight when evaluating
management under [specific risk] rating systems”).
124. F.D.I.C.,
2010
ANNUAL
REPORT
7,
available
at
http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2010annualreport/AR10final.pdf.
125. U.S. bank supervisors subject large banks to a continuous supervision regime. See,
e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK: LARGE
BANK SUPERVISION 17-21 (2010) (explaining that examination of large banks involves a
periodic core assessment that culminates in a report from the OCC to the bank’s board of
directors as well as “various ongoing supervisory activities” and “targeted examinations”—
i.e., integrated risk assessments by business or product line). Regulators usually rely on “the
use of reason and moral suasion” as their “primary corrective tools.” F.D.I.C., RISK
MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 15.1 (2010). The use of these soft
persuasive tactics occurs under the shadow of bank regulators’ statutory powers (i) to order
banks to remediate unsafe or unsound practices uncovered during examinations backed by
specified and open-ended enforcement authority and (ii) to issue cease-and-desist orders
with respect to unsafe or unsound practices. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b) & 1831 (2006). The
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A review of the selected regulatory actions analyzed below reveals
three predominant stages of risk management regulation during this period:
(i) responsibility allocation and internal risk control; (ii) threat description
and control; and (iii) construction of a system of comprehensive enterprise
protection. The first stage included regulatory efforts to respond to the new
operating environment by defining the roles of boards of directors, senior
managers, and the newly formed risk management departments. During
the second stage, regulators heightened the particularity with which they
treated risk, mandating specific procedures to plan for, monitor, assess, and
manage risk, and describing how specific risk objects (e.g., credit risk,
market risk, operational risk) should be controlled. The third stage
articulated the broadest and most encompassing form of risk management
regulation—a regulatory approach that conceived of risk management as an
enterprise-wide program comprehending all exposures and their
interconnections.
The stages are more thematic than strictly chronological, though a
rough chronological order is evident, with the first stage dominating early
phases of policy and giving way to the second stage and, eventually, the
third stage in later phases. Two additional clarifications are in order. First,
these descriptions are not comprehensive and are meant only to provide a
broad overview of the general trends and approaches in the regulation of
risk management practices, in particular how regulators saw them as a
potential solution to problems posed by new market realities. Second,
regulatory action pursuant to these themes was most often accretive and not
substitutive, meaning that regulators periodically would add to the scope of
risk management guidance without paring back previous obligations. One
counter-intuitive aspect of this story is that as regulators expanded the
scope of objects that banks would be required to control, their guidance
became more demanding about the precision with which those objects
would be controlled.
The regulatory guidance gradually became
characterized by an increasing degree of what Harvard Business School

FDIC has special authority to terminate deposit insurance for banks engaged in unsafe or
unsound practices. § 1818(a)(2). The regulatory guidance concerning risk management
thus provides a jurisdictional hook for regulators to jawbone bank management or, where
appropriate, take corrective action. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, OCC BULLETIN 2000-16, RISK MODELING 8 (2000) [hereinafter OCC MODEL
VALIDATION GUIDANCE], available at http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/media/resources/3676/occbl2000-16_risk_model_validation.pdf (“[U]sing unvalidated models to manage risks to the
bank is potentially an unsafe and unsound practice.”); FRB GUIDELINES FOR RATING RISK
MANAGEMENT, supra note 123, at 4 (“An institution’s failure to establish a management
structure that adequately identifies, measures, monitors, and controls the risks involved in its
various products and lines of business has long been considered unsafe and unsound
conduct.”).
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Professor Anette Mikes has labeled “quantitative enthusiasm”:
a
preference for management of risk through precise calculation and
measurement, coupled with a confidence in the robustness and accuracy of
the mathematical models underlying the measurements.126
1. Risk Management as Responsibility Allocation and Internal
Control
The first stage of risk management regulation represents less of a
novel regulatory approach than an effort to translate traditional board duties
to oversee corporate affairs into a new operating environment in which risk
acquired ever-greater salience. It is also characterized by an importation of
internal control mandates into more contexts. This early story starts in the
1980s, perhaps unexpectedly with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB), the former regulator of federally chartered savings associations
(known alternatively as “thrifts”) that by the end of the decade would be
discredited and disbanded due to its perceived ineffectiveness in the leadup to the savings-and-loan debacle.127 During the early part of the decade,
by force of necessity, the FHLBB was an innovator. Dramatic spikes in
short-term interest rates created a crisis for the savings-and-loan industry,
which held assets in the form of long-term mortgage loans. The FRB’s
Regulation Q, which at that time capped interest rates on deposits, provided
some initial support, but thrift depositors began to withdraw en masse in
favor of investment vehicles unencumbered by Regulation Q, such as
money market mutual funds (MMMFs), which were thus able to offer
competitive rates.128 Former FHLBB member Lawrence White’s describes
the thrifts’ dilemma as follows:
With the rising MMMFs rapidly sucking deposits out of thrifts,
Regulation Q was now at best an irrelevance and at worst a cause
of disintermediation. Thrifts could try to prevent deposit
withdrawals by paying higher interest rates. Indeed, this was
tried in June 1978, when the [FRB] loosened Regulation Q
slightly to allow banks and thrifts to pay market rates on [certain]
126. Anette Mikes, Risk Management and Calculative Cultures, 20 MGMT. ACCT. RES.
18, 35 (2009) [hereinafter Calculative Cultures].
127. It is testament to the enduring destabilizing force of housing finance in U.S.
financial markets that the FHLBB’s successor, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), was
itself replaced in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
on account of its failure to provide adequate supervision of several large thrifts and thrift
holding companies. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 313-314, 124 Stat. 1376, 1523-24 (2010).
128. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND
THRIFT REGULATION 67-71 (1991).
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CDs . . . . Thrifts, however, would then suffer operating losses,
since the interest income from their mortgage portfolios would be
insufficient to cover their interest costs. Or they could refuse to
pay the higher interest rates, watch their deposits depart, and be
forced to liquidate their low-interest mortgages at a loss in this
high-interest environment. Either route meant losses. There was
no way to avoid red ink.129
In 1984, the FHLBB made an early attempt to influence risk
management policy at depository institutions130 in response to the shortterm interest rate increases.131 The FHLBB noted that “[f]requent periods
of interest-rate volatility make planning for the continued management of
interest-rate risk a necessity.”132 The FHLBB promulgated a rule requiring
each thrift board of directors to devise and adopt a series of policies to
manage interest rate risk and senior management to implement those
policies and report on them periodically to the board.133 The FHLBB
clarified that it did not intend “to intrude upon the business judgment of
boards of directors of thrift institutions.”134 Instead, its purpose was “to
support responsible management in a task which it has already undertaken
and to enable the [FHLBB] examiners to do their jobs more efficiently.” 135
In the accompanying statement of policy, the FHLBB stated that “[t]he
interest-rate-risk management procedures . . . are intended to ensure that
the boards of directors and management of insured institutions address the
management of interest rate risk.”136 Because one of the responses to
increased volatility on the funding side (i.e., deposits) is to underwrite
newer products on the asset side (e.g., the newly-approved adjustable-rate
mortgages), the FHLBB was careful to instruct thrift boards not to lose
129. Id. at 69-70.
130. See Interest Rate-Risk Management: Proposed Policy Statement and Rule, 49 Fed.
Reg. 19,307 (May 7, 1984) [hereinafter IRRM Proposal] (proposing several rules that would
require the board of directors of each institution insured by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation to develop and implement policies and procedures for management
of interest rate risk).
131. Although the discussion in Part II.A emphasizes how derivatives motivated
regulators to action with respect to risk management, for institutions such as thrifts that were
restricted from transacting in derivatives markets, the increases in interest rate volatility and
inflation constituted serious threats to safety and soundness in their own right.
132. Interest-Rate-Risk Management; Policy Statement and Final Rule, 49 Fed. Reg.
27,295, 27,295 (July 3, 1984) [hereinafter IRRM Final Rule].
133. Id. at 27,295-96. Responsibility for enforcement of the rule was eventually
transferred to the OTS. Transfer and Recodification of Regulations Pursuant to Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 54 Fed. Reg. 49,411 (Nov. 30,
1989) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 563.176); supra note 128 and accompanying text.
134. IRRM Proposal, supra note 130, at 19,308.
135. Id.
136. IRRM Final Rule, supra note 132, at 27,298.
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sight of the multi-dimensionality of risk profiles.137
The FHLBB proved itself a regulatory innovator in the risk
management arena again when it developed similar responsibilityallocating guidelines in the 1988 Thrift Bulletin No. 12 with respect to
what it referred to as “high-risk mortgage derivative products.”138 One of
the major policy responses to the problems posed by increased interest rates
was to liberalize asset restrictions then in force. By expanding the range of
assets thrifts were empowered to hold—for example, credit card and other
consumer loans, commercial real estate loans, commercial loans, adjustable
rate mortgages, and indirect equity positions—the FHLBB hoped that
thrifts might achieve the required rates of return with higher-yielding assets
that they would need to pay to attract and keep deposited funds.139 But the
FHLBB became concerned that thrifts were assuming risks that
compromised their safety and soundness as a result of their new investment
powers, including by speculating in derivatives.140 The Federal Financial
137. Id. (adding the now superseded 12 C.F.R. 571.3(b)). Ten years later, the Farm
Credit Administration (FCA) promulgated a similar rule governing board of director
oversight of interest rate risk management for banks subject to the farm credit system.
Funding and Fiscal Affairs, Loan Policies and Operations, and Funding Operations;
Management of Investments, Liquidity, Interest Rate Risk, and Eligible Investments, 58
Fed. Reg. 63,034, 63,056-57 (Nov. 30, 1993). In 1998, the FCA refined the interest rate risk
management requirements by amending the initial rule to require that the farm credit system
banks “establish a risk management process that effectively identifies, measures, monitors,
and controls interest rate risk.” Organization; Funding and Fiscal Affairs, Loan Policies and
Operations, and Funding Operations; Disclosure to Shareholders; Title V Conservators and
Receivers; Capital Provisions, 63 Fed. Reg. 39,219, 39,225 (July 22, 1998) (codified at 12
C.F.R. § 615.5180) [hereinafter FCA Interest Rate Risk Management Amendments]. The
1998 amendments also divided corporate responsibility for interest rate risk management in
the same manner as the earlier FHLBB rule: the board of directors was charged with
“developing” the interest rate risk management program and senior management was
responsible for “ensuring that interest rate risk is properly managed on both a long-range
and a day-to-day basis.” Id. Interestingly, though, the 1998 amendments charged the board,
and not senior management (as with the FHLBB rule), with the “implementation” of the
rule.
138. FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, THRIFT BULLETIN NO. 12, MORTGAGE
DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS AND MORTGAGE SWAPS 2 (1988) [hereinafter THRIFT BULLETIN NO.
12], available at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/ots/bulletins/rescinded-thriftbulletins/ots-tb-12.pdf.
139. See WHITE, supra note 129, at 72-74 (explaining that thrifts’ specialization was
seen as a major cause of their problems, which could be solved by expanding the assets and
liabilities the thrifts could hold).
140. See Investment Portfolio Policy and Accounting Guidelines: Proposed Rule;
Proposed Statement of Policy, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,244, 23, 245 (proposed June 21, 1988)
(“With the increased investment powers of savings institutions and the increased
proliferation of types of securities, some insured institutions have expanded their investment
activity into a variety of securities as an alternative to traditional lending activities.”
(citation omitted)).
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Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)141 itself had published
supervisory guidance for all bank and thrift examiners concerning these
new securities activities in 1988,142 but the FHLBB went a step further,
imposing a further set of procedural requirements on thrift boards and
managers in addition to their post-1984 interest rate risk management
responsibilities.143
In Thrift Bulletin 12, the FHLBB introduced the problem posed by
these instruments in terms of the dual nature of derivatives: “derivative
products can be useful investment and hedging vehicles,” but “they may
also expose an institution to considerable risk of loss if they are not
managed in a safe and sound manner.”144 The bulletin set forth guidance
concerning board oversight; the need for a “comprehensive business plan”
detailing risk management objectives (including position limits); the
performance of “[s]ensitivity [a]nalysis” before investing in certain
instruments;145 the critical role of either management expertise or qualified
third-party advisors; the establishment of internal controls; and awareness
of potential credit risks posed by insolvent counterparties.146 The mention
of credit risk management was noteworthy since FHLBB and the FFIEC
141. Congress established the FFIEC in 1978 to develop a common set of supervisory
standards to be used by all federal regulators of depository institutions. See RICHARD SCOTT
CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 632 (4th ed. 2008)
(detailing the FFIEC’s composition and its role in promoting regulatory coordination among
multiple agencies). The membership of the FFIEC includes the OCC, the FRB, the FDIC,
and the National Credit Union Administration. Id.; see also supra note 127 (explaining that
the OTS no longer exists).
142. See, e.g., Supervisory Policy Statement Concerning Selection of Securities Dealers,
Securities Portfolio Policies and Strategies and Unsuitable Investment Practices, and
Stripped Mortgage-Backed Securities, Certain CMO Tranches, Residuals, and Zero-Coupon
Bonds: Request for Comment, 56 Fed. Reg. 263 (Jan. 3, 1991) (noting that all member
agencies of FFIEC except FHLBB had adopted FFIEC’s 1988 supervisory guidance);
Supervisory Policy Concerning Selection of Securities Dealers and Unsuitable Investment
Practices, 53 Fed. Reg. 14,852 (Apr. 26, 1988) [hereinafter Unsuitable Investment Practices]
(adopting FFIEC supervisory policy, which banned or restricted certain classes of securities,
to apply to institutions subject to FRB supervision). The FFIEC guidance did not address
risk management in anywhere near the level of detail that the FHLBB did with its Thrift
Bulletin 12. The single instance of risk management regulation in the FFIEC guidance was
its instruction to bank boards to develop and document “plans prescribing specific
positioning limits and control arrangements for enforcing these limits” for investments in
“stripped mortgage backed securities.” Id. at 14,855.
143. THRIFT BULLETIN NO. 12, supra note 138, at 1.
144. Id.
145. The sensitivity analysis is an early example of regulator-administered stress testing.
The FHLBB “strongly recommended” a series of stress scenarios that thrifts should consider
before investing. Id. at 2.
146. Id. at 3-4. The gradual broadening of risk management regulation into credit and
other non-interest rate risks anticipates the second stage of risk management regulation
discussed below in Part II.C.1.
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had previously focused exclusively on interest rate risk.
A year later, the FHLBB published a more comprehensive investment
portfolio policy statement applying to all investment activities of thrifts,
including investing in derivatives.147 Again, the FHLBB emphasized the
importance of a “written investment policy” setting forth the board’s vision
of the “appropriate investment course for the institution, given the present
financial position of the institution and the current and reasonably
anticipated economic environment.”148 Further, thrift management would
be required to develop “investment strategies that set out, in reasonable
detail, the manner in which the investment policy [would be]
implemented”—including, for example, the “acceptable range of interest
rate risk for each type of security.”149 Specifically, in setting the interest
rate risk management strategies, management should include planned
organizational responses to different interest rate environments and other
“external factors that past history and current events support as being
reasonable.”150 “Reasonabl[e] foreseeab[ility]”151 was undefined, left for
deliberation by thrift management. The FHLBB observed that its guidance
on securities-related risk management flowed from the interaction of the
regulatory goal of safety and soundness, a board’s duty of care, and the
need for an adequate internal control environment.152 In this respect, the
FHLBB presaged the key theme picked up on again in the Caremark case,
the Cadbury Report, and the COSO internal controls framework. But in
certain respects, the policy statement went further in that it allocated
responsibility for establishing systems that would navigate risks that
threaten the achievement of the board’s entire investment strategy, though
without specifying what those risks entail.
147. See Investment Portfolio Policy and Accounting Guidelines: Final Rule; Final
Statement of Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 23,457, 23,458 n.1 (June 1, 1989).
148. Id. at 23,463.
149. Id.
150. Id. GAAP accounting treatment provided (and still provides) that only held-forinvestment (now known as “held-to-maturity”) securities can be accounted for using
amortized cost accounting – the method that thrifts favored during the 1980s because the
amortized cost was usually higher than the market values that would otherwise apply. See
id. (explaining that amortized cost accounting can only be used when there is a positive
intent and ability to hold the security to maturity). With the investment portfolio policy
statement, the accounting rules interacted with the corporate governance implications of the
investment risk management policies. Specifically, the bounds of reasonable foreseeability,
as set by management, delimited the range of circumstances in which thrifts could sell heldfor-investment securities. If management believed a set of circumstances to be outside its
reasonable forecast and to require divestment of otherwise held-for-investment securities, it
would be required to document its belief. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 23,465-66 (mandating that management document changes to valuation
methods resulting from circumstances that arise outside the range of foreseeable events).
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Early international attempts to shape derivatives risk management
were similarly limited to responsibility allocation and internal control.
International bank regulators, including most prominently the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee),153 made initial
forays into risk management to address a problem that U.S. bank regulators
had not yet addressed. Its Management of Banks’ Off-Balance-Sheet
Exposures paper, published in 1986, provided guidance to banks
concerning risk management practices for derivatives and other off-balance
sheet exposures. Noting that off-balance-sheet exposures—including, most
prominently, derivatives154—“raise particular difficulties in view of the[ir]
complexity,” the Basel Committee warned that “banks run the risk of losses
arising from any failure to apply adequate control systems.”155 The
Committee’s solution was to remind banks of the importance of internal
controls156 and instruct bank boards as follows:
[B]ank boards need formal written policies to govern all trading
activities. While the ability to make quick decisions is
undoubtedly a key factor in the current environment, banks may
need to re-examine the structure of their risk assessment and
accounting systems, as well as current management procedures,
in order to ensure that decisions are taken with an informed
appreciation of the risks.157
A year later, the Bank of England “stated that banks’ records and
internal controls should identify risk exposure limits, particularly those
related to derivatives, monitor compliance with such limits, properly value
positions, and ensure that management was adequately informed.”158 In
1990, France’s Banking Commission promulgated a rule requiring banks to
set and monitor compliance with limits on risk exposure in connection with

153. The Basel Committee is a standing committee composed of bank regulators from
major developed nations that, among other things, develops important guidelines and
supervisory standards for bank regulators to implement in their home jurisdictions. Central
bank governors and bank supervisors from the Group of Ten nations founded the Basel
Committee in 1974 under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements to address
the immediate problems arising in connection with the collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt and
Franklin National banks. Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and
Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital
Adequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 800 (2010).
154. The Basel Committee also cited guarantees, lending commitments, and
underwriting commitments as off-balance sheet exposures requiring special attentiveness to
risk build-up.
155. MANAGEMENT OF OFF-BALANCE SHEET EXPOSURES, supra note 61, at 13.
156. Id. at ¶ 46.
157. Id. at ¶ 47.
158. GAO DERIVATIVES REPORT, supra note 67, at 114.
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interest rate swaps.159 In 1991 and 1992, respectively, Swiss and
Singaporean bank regulators published guidance for domestic banks
transacting in derivatives markets that emphasized the importance of
effective internal control systems.160
2. Risk Management as Threat Description and Control
During the second stage of risk management regulation, Congress and
bank supervisors expanded their attention from responsibility allocation
and internal control to developing more specific requirements that banks
monitor and exert control over a greater array of specified risks. Congress
set the tone for this next stage in a rarely examined provision of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA). As noted earlier, the FHLBB, likely on account of the unique
interest rate risk vulnerabilities of the thrift institutions it supervised,161
acted first to address interest rate risk in 1984.162 While the thrift industry
accounted for an outsized proportion of the interest rate risk problems of
the 1980s, it quickly became apparent that these problems, borne of new
financial innovations and increased rate volatility, could affect all financial
institutions equally. In response, Congress enacted FIRREA. From a risk
management perspective, FIRREA is noteworthy because it marks the first
time that Congress addressed risk management at financial institutions as a
legislative subject. Specifically, Congress instructed federal financial
institution regulators to conduct a study of “[t]he feasibility of developing
and administering . . . an examination of the principles and techniques of
risk management and the application of such principles and techniques to
the management of insured institutions.”163 Congress also directed the
FFIEC164 to “develop and administer training seminars in risk
management” for bank examiners and bank personnel.165 The open-ended
charge afforded wide discretion to regulators to elaborate risk management
norms concerning an equally open-ended array of risks.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Joint Agency Policy Statement: Interest Rate Risk, 61 Fed. Reg. 33,166,
33,169 (June 26, 1996) [hereinafter Final Joint Agency Policy on Interest Rate Risk]
(distinguishing commercial banks from thrifts on the grounds that the former “do not hold
high concentrations” of “residential mortgage assets, especially adjustable rate mortgages”).
162. See supra notes 131-138 and accompanying text (describing the FHLBB’s
activities in the 1980s to address this risk).
163. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
101-73, § 1001(b)(9), 103 Stat. 183, 508 (1989).
164. See supra note 142 (explaining the FFIEC’s role as standard setter for bank
examinations).
165. Id. § 1218, 103 Stat. at 546 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3309).
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In 1992, the FFIEC followed the FHLBB’s lead when it published a
new supervisory policy on securities activities, largely replicating the
FHLBB’s earlier guidance concerning investment policies and high-risk
mortgage products and applying it to all federally regulated banking
institutions.166 Notably, however, the FFIEC specifically required banks to
consider, in addition to interest rate risk, other risk factors such as: assetliability mismatching, asset concentration risk, liquidity risk, credit risk,
market volatility risk, and “management’s capabilities”167 – an early
reference to a new category of risk that later would be labeled “operational
risk.”168 If FIRREA signaled to bank regulators congressional expectations
that they develop more detailed risk management guidance, the 1992 policy
initiated a period during which the regulators sharpened their focus on the
specific risks that banks should be managing.
In 1993, the OCC published Circular 277, entitled Risk Management

166. See Supervisory Policy Statement on Securities Activities, 57 Fed. Reg. 4,028
(Feb. 3, 1992) (updating and revising the FFIEC’s policy on selection of securities dealers
and requiring the establishment of prudent policies for transactions). Once the FFIEC
issued its policy statement concerning risk management of securities activities, the FHLBB
removed its earlier investment portfolio policy statement and Thrift Bulletin 12 concerning,
respectively, securities activities and mortgage derivatives. Investment Portfolio Policy and
Accounting Guidelines: Final Rule; Removal of Statement of Policy and Conforming
Amendments, 57 Fed Reg. 26,989 (June 17, 1992); OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, THRIFT
BULLETIN NO. 52, SUPERVISORY STATEMENT OF POLICY ON SECURITIES ACTIVITIES (Jan. 10,
1992). For a discussion of these superseded policies, see supra notes 138-152 and
accompanying text.
167. Supervisory Policy Statement on Securities Activities, 57 Fed. Reg. at 4034; see
also Investment Portfolio Policy and Accounting Guidelines: Final Rule; Removal of
Statement of Policy and Conforming Amendments, 57 Fed Reg. at 26,989-90 (setting forth
Section II of the policy statement regarding “policies and strategies”). Another notable
aspect of the 1992 supervisory policy took the form of a technology-based, structural
regulatory rule applying certain conservative accounting rules to mortgage-related
derivatives meeting any of three supervisory tests, known as “high-risk tests,” that gauged
the perceived riskiness of the derivative. Supervisory Policy Statement on Securities
Activities: Statement of Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 4,031 (setting forth Section III of the policy
statement regarding “Mortgage Derivative Products, Other Asset Backed Products, and
Zero-Coupon Bonds”). The contrast between the high-risk test rule and the risk
management guidelines recalls the Coglianese-Lazer distinction between technology-based
regulation and management-based regulation: the former is a structural, top-down,
technology-based rule that was already very nearly an anachronism at that stage, whereas
the latter are classic examples of ambitious management-based regulation. See supra notes
30-37 and accompanying text (explaining differences between technology-based regulation
and management-based regulation).
Regulators would struggle with this sort of
methodological choice throughout this period, nearly always eschewing technology-based
regulation on the grounds that, as noted by Tarullo, the “risks associated with the
complexity and pace of large bank activities cannot be effectively contained even with
sophisticated rules.” TARULLO, supra note 69, at 274.
168. BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 55, at 144.
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of Financial Derivatives.169 When it was issued, the Circular was the most
comprehensive regulatory taxonomy of risks and description of regulatory
expectations with respect to risk management practices. The largest banks
have always been the most significant derivatives dealers because they are
perceived as the most stable counterparties due to their massive balance
sheets and access to government safety nets. It is not surprising, then, that
the OCC—which is charged with the supervision of federally chartered
banks such as today’s J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and
Citigroup—was the first regulator to address risk management norms in a
systematic manner. The Circular addressed market, credit, liquidity, legal,
and operational risks. It applied to all national banks, though the OCC
recognized that banks that were dealers or active position takers would
likely require more extensive risk management programs than banks that
were more limited end-users of derivatives (e.g., for hedging purposes).170
Circular 277 recited as its basic premise the dual nature of
derivatives171 and noted the OCC’s position that “the best defense against
sizeable individual losses or significant systemic disruptions is the
implementation and use by individual banks of sound and efficient risk
management systems.”172 If properly designed, such systems “should
prevent significant losses due to counterparty failure or adverse changes in
market conditions.”173 National banks were to implement “comprehensive
risk management systems” to “ensure that market factors affecting risk
exposures are adequately measured, monitored, and controlled.”174 The
OCC nodded its head in approval at the “sophisticated approaches” to
managing derivatives-related risks that several banks had developed, and it
indicated that it expected banks themselves to develop the content of the
risk management norms.175
For banks that offered dealer services or conducted trading operations,
the systems would need to quantify market risk exposures as well as
“facilitate stress testing and enable management to assess the potential
impact of various changes in market factors on earnings and capital.”176 In
performing the stress tests, banks were directed to evaluate risk exposures
under various scenarios that represent a broad range of potential market
169. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANKING CIRCULAR NO. 277, RISK
MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (1993) [hereinafter OCC CIRCULAR 277].
170. Id. at 15, 21.
171. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (discussing how derivatives are used
to both enhance and minimize market exposure).
172. OCC CIRCULAR 277, supra note 170, at 4.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 8.
175. Id. at 1.
176. Id. at 9.
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movements and corresponding price declines.
As for credit risk, banks were required to ensure that derivatives
transactions were authorized and consistent with risk management policies.
Again, the OCC emphasized the need to quantify exposures, this time by
producing a “number representing a reasonable approximation of loan
equivalency, that is, the amount of credit exposure inherent in a comparable
extension of credit.”177 The exposure quantity would take into account
current exposure and a more opaque “credit risk add-on” charge that
represented “the likelihood that market rates or prices will change over the
life of a contract.”178
These risk management systems would contain exposure limits with
respect to credit risk and “inter-connected risk positions” and regular
reporting to senior management and the board of directors.179 In a preview
of the next thematic stage of risk management regulation, the OCC noted
that bank management should make efforts to “develop the ability . . . to
determine the aggregate risk profile of the institution.”180 In addition to the
risk management systems, the Circular dictated that a risk management
infrastructure should include: (i) comprehensive written policies, reviewed
by senior management and endorsed by the board of directors, governing
the use of derivatives; (ii) a dedicated risk management unit or individual
responsible for “measuring and reporting” exposures;181 and (iii) audit
coverage of derivatives-related risks by auditors independent of the units
transacting in derivatives.182
Two months after the OCC published Circular 277, the FRB issued
Supervisory Letter 93-69, which provided guidance with respect to the risk
management of securities and derivatives trading activities for FRBregulated banks.183 Supervisory Letter 93-69 largely tracked the content of

177. Id. at 13.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 8.
180. Id. at 10.
181. Id. at 7.
182. Id. at 7-13. The Circular did not require an outside audit of derivatives activities.
183. The terms of Supervisory Letter SR 93-69 specifically targeted the operating
companies and branches subject to FRB supervision: state banks that are members of the
Federal Reserve System, branches and agencies of foreign banks, and FRB-chartered
affiliates of bank holding companies conducting international banking business (named
“Edge [Act] corporations” after the 1919 Edge Act that added section 25A to the Federal
Reserve Act). BD. GOV. FED. RES. SYS., SR 93-69 (FIS), EXAMINING RISK MANAGEMENT
AND INTERNAL CONTROLS FOR TRADING ACTIVITIES OF BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 1 (1993).
The FRB noted, however, that the principles in the Letter applied equally to FRB-regulated
holding company systems and directed holding company examiners to “assess
management’s application of [the] guidance to the holding company . . . where appropriate.”
Id.
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Circular 277. Specifically, the Letter emphasized three elements required
of risk management systems: (i) board and management oversight; (ii) a
risk management process comprised of a “comprehensive risk
measurement approach,”184 detailed limits and parameters governing risk
taking, and a strong communication system for monitoring and reporting
risk exposures within the bank; and (iii) internal controls and audit
procedures.185 It too made overtures to a more comprehensive form of risk
management that would aggregate risk exposures throughout the institution
using a common set of parameters, though it ultimately urged the
integration of the mandatory risk management processes into the
institution’s overall risk management system “to the fullest extent
possible.”186
From a corporate governance perspective, Circular 277 and
Supervisory Letter 93-69 represented a new, albeit imprecise, venture into
competences previously considered the exclusive purview of management
and the board of directors: setting risk limits, communication lines, and
internal audit procedures. While the latter two concerns are arguably part
of any internal controls program, the establishment of risk limits was a new
and noteworthy regulatory development, though the OCC left the methods
by which the risk limits were to be formulated undeveloped.
For its part, the Basel Committee expanded on its 1986 guidance187
when it published a 1994 paper entitled Risk Management Guidelines for
Derivatives.188 The 1994 guidance sounded the same themes as OCC
Circular 277: board and management oversight, internal controls and
audits, and the newer requirement of a “risk management process.”189 The
guidance pertaining to oversight was anodyne, simply applying the nearuniversal precept that management assumes responsibility for the policies
for conducting business while the board approves significant policies
relating to the management of risks throughout the institution. The
guidance for internal controls and audits was similarly uneventful.
Importantly, however, the Basel Committee agreed with the OCC that
where a firm engages in large-scale derivatives activities, it should
establish an independent risk management unit. But the Basel Committee
went further than the OCC, stating that the “personnel staffing independent
risk management functions should have a complete understanding of the

184. Id. at 3.
185. Id. at 1-3.
186. Id. at 3.
187. See supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Basel
Committee’s early work.
188. BASEL RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 5.
189. Id. passim.
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risks associated with all of the bank’s derivatives activities.”190 Before
engaging in new derivatives activities, management was instructed to
conduct “an analysis of the risks that may arise from the activities.”191 The
novelty of the guidance is, as with Supervisory Letter 93-69 and Circular
277, its discussion of the “risk management process” itself.
As mentioned earlier, Congress enacted FDICIA in 1991, overhauling
many of the laws concerning bank supervision and resolution.192 Section
305 of FDICIA constituted another intrusion into risk management
practices by federal authorities. Specifically, it instructed all federal
banking regulators to incorporate consideration of interest rate risk into the
capital adequacy regime.193 Federal regulators jointly implemented this
directive after an extensive rulemaking process through two regulatory
actions. First, they revised capital standards to “explicitly include a bank’s
exposure to declines in [its] economic value due to changes in interest rates
as a factor that [regulators would] consider when evaluating . . . capital
adequacy.”194 Second, they published a Final Joint Agency Policy on
Interest Rate Risk, which identified the key elements of what regulators
would consider sound management of interest rate risk. 195 The revisions to
the capital standards, published in 1995, amounted to little more than an
expression of regulators’ intention to take interest rate risk into
consideration. In other words, instead of assessing a specific capital charge
for interest rate risk as Congress intended, they implemented section 305
by tautology. The regulators referred to this approach, which relied on a
combination of “quantitative and qualitative factors,” as a “‘risk
assessment’ approach.”196 At the time, however, regulators saw the risk
assessment approach as a short-term solution and anticipated replacing the
provisory risk assessment approach with an explicit minimum capital
charge.197
While deliberating on the optimal form for the minimum capital
charge, the FRB, OCC, and FDIC took note that the banks under their
supervision had “been offering and holding a growing variety of products .
190. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
191. Id.
192. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing the changes following
the savings and loan crisis).
193. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-242,
§ 305, 105 Stat. 2236, 2354 (1991). Section 305 also addressed credit concentration risk
and the risks of “nontraditional activities.” Id.
194. Risk-Based Capital Standards: Interest Rate Risk, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,490, 39,491
(Aug. 2, 1995).
195. Final Joint Agency Policy on Interest Rate Risk, supra note 162, at 33,166.
196. Id. at 33,169.
197. See id. at 33,167 (“The intent of the agencies at that time was to implement an
explicit minimum capital charge for interest rate risk at a future date . . . .”).
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. . such as certain collateralized mortgage obligations and structured notes”
and that “a variety of pricing indices and embedded options [were now]
incorporated into their commercial and retail bank products.”198 These
exposures complicated the ability of bank regulators to construct a set
capital charge that apportioned an appropriate amount of capital to cover
the array of new, often firm-specific, exposures. In the face of their
uncertainty, the regulators responded with an unconventional solution:
they would retain the risk assessment approach indefinitely and instead
seek to influence the risk management process directly by making the
quantitative and qualitative factors a permanent feature of capital
regulation. In most cases, the regulators would administer the quantitative
factors by looking to the estimates generated by the banks’ internal risk
management systems.199 The regulators would gauge the qualitative factors
by evaluating “whether a bank follows sound risk management practices
for interest rate risk when assessing its aggregate interest rate risk exposure
and its need for capital.”200 The regulators provided guidance concerning
their recommendations for sound risk management. Specifically, those
recommendations included both substantive requirements and procedural
corporate governance elements. The substantive requirements mandated
that banks put in place the following:
[p]olicies and procedures designed to control the nature and
amount of interest rate risk the bank takes, including those that
specify risk limits and define lines of responsibilit[y] and
authority for [risk management];
[a] system for identifying and measuring interest rate risk;
[a] system for monitoring and reporting risk exposures; and
[a] system of internal controls, review, and audit to ensure the
integrity of the . . . risk management [function].201
Boards were instructed to: (i) “establish and guide” the bank’s risk
tolerance (including by setting risk limits);202 (ii) identify persons
responsible for managing risk;203 (iii) ensure adequate resources are
devoted to risk management; and (iv) monitor the bank’s overall risk

198. Final Joint Agency Policy on Interest Rate Risk, supra note 161, at 33,168-69.
199. Risk-Based Capital Standards: Interest Rate Risk, 60 Fed. Reg. at 39,491.
200. Final Joint Agency Policy on Interest Rate Risk, supra note 162, at 33,169.
201. Id. at 33,170.
202. Id.
203. Id. The responsibilities to be allocated pertained to the identification of potential
interest rate risk arising from existing or new products or activities, the establishment and
maintenance of an interest rate risk measurement system, the formulation and execution of
strategies to manage interest rate exposures, and the authorization of exceptions to risk
management policies. Id. at 33,171.
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profile.204 Senior management, on the other hand, was to: (i) translate the
board’s risk tolerance into implementable policies; (ii) ensure adherence to
lines of responsibility established by the board; (iii) oversee the
implementation and maintenance of systems that “identify, measure,
monitor, and control” interest rate risk; and (iv) establish “internal controls
. . . to ensure the integrity of the . . . risk management process.”205 This
expansive treatment of interest rate risk management recalled several of the
key principles animating the OCC and FRB treatment of risk management
for derivatives in OCC Circular 277 and FRB Supervisory Letter 93-69.
While the FFIEC and its member agencies articulated their
expectations for what risk management systems should look like, they were
contemporaneously working to incorporate those new norms into their
supervisory rating system. The FFIEC amended its Uniform Financial
Institutions Ratings System (UFIRS) system for rating depository
institutions for supervisory examination purposes to include express
consideration of risk management.206 The UFIRS rating system, known
more commonly as CAMELS,207 was adopted in 1979 to provide a uniform
basis for evaluating the soundness of depository institutions and a means of
identifying institutions requiring special supervisory attention or concern.208
Under the UFIRS, each depository institution is assigned a composite
rating based on an evaluation and rating of essential components of an
institution’s financial condition and operations: the adequacy of capital,
the quality of assets, the capability of the board of directors and
management, the quality and level of earnings, the adequacy of liquidity,
and the sensitivity to market risk. The 1996 amendments, among other
things, incorporated sensitivity to market risk as a component for the first
time and instructed examiners to accord “increasing emphasis on the
quality of risk management processes in each of the component ratings,
particularly in the Management component[.]”209 In making the changes,
the FFIEC incanted the traditional story dogma that risk management was
an antidote to the new risk profiles of banks:
Changes in the financial services industry, however, have
204. See id. at 33,170 (calling specifically for determining “lines of authority and
responsibility”).
205. Id.
206. Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed. Reg. 67,021 (Dec. 19,
1996).
207. CAMELS is an acronym standing for Capital adequacy, quality of Assets,
capability of Management, Earnings quality, Liquidity adequacy, and Sensitivity to market
risk. The 1996 amendments incorporated consideration of market risk sensitivity for the
first time; prior to that point, UFIRS was referred to as CAMEL with the “S” omitted. Id.
208. Id. at 67,022.
209. Id. at 67,022 (emphasis added).
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broadened the range of financial products offered by institutions
and accelerated the pace of transactions. These trends reinforce
the importance of institutions having sound risk management
systems. Accordingly, the revised rating system contains explicit
language in each of the components emphasizing management’s
ability to identify, measure, monitor, and control risks.210
Since 1979, the FRB has had a separate supervisory rating system (known
as BOPEC) for its examination of bank holding company systems. By the
time the FFIEC published its UFIRS amendments, the FRB had already
issued a supervisory letter in 1995 incorporating consideration of risk
management into the management component of the UFIRS and BOPEC
ratings for FRB-regulated institutions.211 In 2004, the FRB eliminated
BOPEC altogether and replaced it with a new bank holding company rating
system, known by the cumbersome acronym RFI/C(D), that requires a
standalone assessment of risk management.212
3. Risk Management as Comprehensive Enterprise Protection
The third thematic phase of risk management regulation is
characterized by increased quantitative enthusiasm and confidence in the
ability of banks to manage their exposures on a comprehensive, enterprisewide basis by understanding interconnections among exposures and
aggregating them with common risk metrics. In certain respects, this was a
return to first principles: a reminder both that the board of directors and
executives were responsible for risk policy design and implementation, and
that mechanical application of technical know-how on a portfolio-byportfolio basis and a risk-by-risk basis was not adequate.213 No longer
would it be enough to put in place risk limits and policies; risk needed to be
managed across and throughout financial conglomerates. In this respect,
210. Id. at 67,023-24.
211. Supervisory Letter 95-51, which has since been superseded by the RFI/C(D)
ratings system discussed in the subsequent footnote, instructed examiners to assign a formal
supervisory rating to the adequacy of FRB-regulated institutions’ risk management systems,
to be “given significant weight” when evaluating the management component of the UFIRS
and the FRB’s supervisory rating system for bank holding companies (known at the time as
BOPEC). See FRB GUIDELINES FOR RATING RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 123124.
212. Bank Holding Company Rating System, 69 Fed. Reg. 70,444 (Dec. 6, 2004). The
risk management (R) component from the new RFI/C(D) system is “based on the same
guidance that has been used to rate risk management since 1995”—i.e., since the issuance of
Supervisory Letter 95-51. Id. at 70,445.
213. See DAS, supra note 27, at 4 (explaining difference between “trading risk
management”—or “micro risk management at the level of individual traders and trading
desks”—and “firm wide risk management”—which focuses on “matching risk. . . with
capital to ensure the ability of the [entire] firm to absorb trading risk”).
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the regulatory guidance must be considered alongside the burgeoning field
of enterprise risk management (ERM).
Though bank regulators largely avoided the ERM term, they embraced
its almost utopian pretension of total risk control. As a reminder that the
stages of risk management highlighted in this Part are more thematic than
strictly chronological, consider the Basel Committee’s 1986 preview of
ERM (before it was known as such):
It is not sufficient, however, to concentrate on the specific risks
of individual instruments. Central coordination and control of
the totality of the risk involved in trading in a variety of different
instruments is also important because of the linkages between
them. This is no easy task. Since it is obviously more difficult
for banking groups with extensive decentralized branch networks
and extended corporate structures to coordinate their operations
than for single compact units, attention also has to be paid to the
need for high standards of group control and for a worldwide
consolidated approach to the supervision of risks, both on and off
the balance sheet.214
At the time the Basel Committee did not develop the notion further.
By 2004, however, COSO had published Enterprise Risk Management—
Integrated Framework, which built on the earlier internal controls
framework215 and purported to direct information flows regarding risk
within an organization so as to “strike an optimal balance between growth
and return goals and related risks” and “effectively deploy[] resources in
pursuit of the entity’s objectives.”216 The COSO framework noted that,
“[i]n sum,” ERM “helps an entity get to where it wants to go and avoid
pitfalls and surprises along the way.”217 The COSO ERM framework
identifies eight “components” of ERM: (1) the firm’s internal environment
must set the tone for how risk is viewed and addressed; (2) management
must identify objectives in order to properly identify risks that compromise
the firm’s objectives; (3) events affecting the achievement of firm goals
(both risks and opportunities) must be identified and communicated to
management for purposes of re-evaluating firm strategy and objectives; (4)
risk must be assessed according to probability and impact; (5) management
must select responses to identified risks; (6) controls must be established to
track firm progress; (7) relevant information must be identified, captured,
214. MANAGEMENT OF OFF-BALANCE SHEET EXPOSURES, supra note 61, at 14.
215. See supra notes 9899-104105 and accompanying text for a description of the
COSO internal controls framework.
216. COMM. OF THE SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, ENTERPRISE RISK
MANAGEMENT—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 1 (2004) [hereinafter COSO ERM FRAMEWORK],
available at http://www.coso.org/documents/coso_erm_executivesummary.pdf.
217. Id.
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and communicated in a form and timeframe that enables responsible parties
to perform; and (8) the entire ERM infrastructure must be monitored and
modified as necessary.218 The framework resonated with the development
of so-called economic capital modeling, which referred to the quantitative
techniques by which banks and other financial institutions would allocate
capital to business lines, product categories, portfolios, and individual
assets consistent with mathematical estimates of risks across the institution
as a whole.219 The COSO ERM framework, like the COSO internal
controls framework, is not a source of law itself, but rather its pretensions
to comprehensive risk control help frame the third thematic phase of risk
management regulation.
For instance, the FFIEC articulated a broad ERM-type vision in a
1998 policy statement that it heralded as a new comprehensive “risk-based
supervision approach” to bank examination.220 The policy statement, titled
Supervisory Policy Statement on Securities Activities and End-User
Derivatives Activities, supplemented the 1996 Final Joint Agency Policy on
Interest Rate Risk221 and replaced the 1992 Supervisory Policy Statement on
Securities Activities.222 The earlier 1992 policy statement had, as noted
above, subjected several types of derivatives to so-called “high risk tests”
to determine their accounting treatment.223 In the years leading up to the
1998 re-work of the policy, FFIEC members began to question the
effectiveness of the “pass/fail criteria of the high risk tests[.]”224 In
particular, they feared that the specification of the tests had dulled the
218. Id. at 3-4.
219. See Esa Jokivuolle, Aligning Regulatory Capital with Economic Capital, in RISK
MANAGEMENT: A MODERN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 24, at 455 (noting the importance of
consistently applying minimum capital requirements to all banks regardless of the
institutions’ own perspectives on capital requirements).
220. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NO. OCC 1998-20, POLICY
STATEMENT ON INVESTMENT SECURITIES (1998), available at http://www.occ.gov/newsissuances/bulletins/1998/bulletin-1998-20.html.
221. See supra notes 196-206 and accompanying text for details of the publication. The
scope of the new policy statement was broad, though it excluded derivatives transactions
that were recorded as trading transactions. See Supervisory Policy Statement on Investment
Securities and End-User Derivatives Activities, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,191, 20,194 (Apr. 23, 1998)
(defining the scope of the guidance as including money market instruments, different types
of notes, asset-backed securities, and mortgage derivative products). See also Risk-Based
Capital Standards: Market Risk, 61 Fed. Reg. 47,358 (Sept. 6, 1996) (noting that
transactions recorded on the trading account were already subject to separate supervisory
treatment under the 1996 risk-based capital regime applicable to market risk exposures).
222. See supra notes 167-168 and accompanying text for details regarding the
Supervisory Policy Statement.
223. Supervisory Policy Statement on Securities Activities, supra note 166.
224. Supervisory Policy Statement on Investment Securities and End-User Derivatives
Activities, supra note 222, at 20,192.
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incentives of banks to perform meaningful risk assessment and analysis.
Accordingly, FFIEC eliminated the high-risk tests and emphasized, using a
formulation that was by this point familiar, that “an effective risk
management program, through which an institution identifies, measures,
monitors, and controls the risks of investment activities, provides a better
framework.”225 The regulators again stressed their belief that risk
management was an antidote to the increasing complexity of on- and offbalance sheet assets226 and that a risk management program must entail
procedural, technical, and internal control elements.227 Though much of the
1998 policy statement could be characterized as humdrum from the
perspective of the banks, the FFIEC nevertheless expressed the most
comprehensive statement of risk management norms yet in U.S. banking
regulation: “Effective risk management addresses risks across all types of
instruments on an investment portfolio basis and ideally, across the entire
institution.”228 This dictate widened the dimensionality, though not the
number, of subjects that bank risk management departments were to
monitor and control.229 “To the extent practicable,” measurements of
exposures “should be aggregated and integrated with similar exposures
arising from other business activities to obtain the institution’s overall risk
profile.”230
The 1998 policy statement did not venture into virgin territory. We
have already seen how OCC Circular 277 and FRB Supervisory Letter 9369 required bank risk managers to consider the interconnections between
risk positions and develop methods for determining institution-wide,
aggregate risk profiles.231 In 1996, the OCC issued guidance in an advisory
letter regarding the newly developed credit derivatives, such as credit
default swaps and total return swaps.232 The 1996 credit derivatives

225. Id.
226. See id. (citing the need for a comprehensive response to the increased investment
risk).
227. Id. at 20,194.
228. Id. at 20,192 (emphasis added).
229. Recall that the 1992 Supervisory Policy Statement on Securities Activities had
already required banks to address asset-liability mismatching, asset concentration risk,
liquidity risk, credit risk, market volatility risk, and operational risk. See supra note 168 and
accompanying text.
230. Supervisory Policy Statement on Investment Securities and End-User Derivatives
Activities, supra note 222 at 20,194.
231. See supra notes 180-181 and 184-187 and accompanying text (discussing OCC
Circular 277).
232. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC 1996-43, DESCRIPTION OF
GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL BANKS WITH RESPECT TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES (1996), available
at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/1996/bulletin-1996-43.html.
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guidance cited the treatment of “interconnection risk” in Circular 277.233
However, the 1996 guidance went a step further. The Circular only
required banks to “develop” aggregate, institution-wide estimates of risk,
but the 1996 guidance imposed consideration of correlations and
interconnections among portfolio positions as a pre-condition to transacting
in credit derivatives.234 Another advisory letter, issued in 1994 to cover
structured notes, expressed similarly high expectations of risk management:
“The OCC considers it an unsafe and unsound practice for a bank to
purchase material amounts of structured notes, or any other bank asset,
without a full appreciation of the risks involved.”235
D. Risk Management and Capital Adequacy
This section chronicles how the nuts and bolts of the capital adequacy
regime, the linchpin of modern bank regulation, gradually transformed
from a relatively simple and mechanical set of supervisory formulas to the
regulation of risk management. The three-stage regulatory process
discussed above in sub-Part II.C addresses risk management systems as
part of the examination process. By the mid-1990s, however, the Basel
Committee had begun to address risk management as part of the capital
adequacy regime too. Before addressing the Basel Committee’s coupling
of risk management and capital regulation, however, an early industrybased endeavor merits special attention. In 1993, the Group of Thirty, a
committee composed of senior bankers and their lawyers, published
perhaps the ultimate expression of the traditional risk management story
during this period: a consultative report entitled Derivatives: Practice and
Principles. The report presents the industrial vision of risk management as
an aspirational system of control characterized by quantitative enthusiasm
and a faith in the ability of risk managers to reduce risk exposures to
common variables susceptible to enterprise-wide aggregation.
The report aimed to “define a set of sound risk management practices
for dealers and end-users” of derivatives.236 Despite the Group’s assertion
that its efforts were to be considered separately from ongoing regulatory
233. Id. at 2.
234. Id. at 3 (“Prior to substantial participation in the market for credit derivatives,
protection selling banks should thoroughly evaluate their credit portfolios, identifying credit
concentrations and risk inter-connections, in order to assess how these products can best
help to achieve strategic portfolio objectives.”).
235. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER 94-2,
PURCHASES OF STRUCTURED NOTES 4 (July 21, 1994), available at
http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/memos-advisory-letters/pre-1995/advisory-letter1994-2.pdf (emphasis added).
236. PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 46 (preface).

WEBER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

8/21/2013 4:53 PM

THE LAW AND REGULATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT

1053

initiatives concerning risk management, it picked up on the same themes.
Included in the document were twenty-four recommendations, ranging
from broad but banal incantations of senior management’s oversight
responsibilities to narrow discussions of specific mark-to-market valuation
methods, standardized contractual provisions, and accounting rules.237 The
Group of Thirty advocated for the measurement of market risk through
value-at-risk approaches using probability analysis based upon a common
confidence interval. J.P. Morgan staff had pioneered value-at-risk
techniques shortly before the report’s publication in the management of its
own risk.238 The techniques estimated the maximum expected loss from an
adverse market movement within a specified probability level (known as
the “confidence level”) over a particular time (known as the “time
horizon”).239 The report presaged the enterprise-wide focus that would
come to dominate risk management discourse in the later part of the
decade: “Reducing market risks across derivatives to a single common
denominator makes aggregation, comparison, and risk control easier.”240
Moreover, the report urged banks to quantify estimates of current and
potential future losses due to credit risk despite the acknowledged
difficulties with assessing the effects of potential defaults.241 The report
also recommended that banks establish dedicated business units,
independent of revenue generating units, to perform the recommended
measurement tasks, including most prominently the value-at-risk
calculations.242 The Group of Thirty’s embrace of value-at-risk techniques
presaged key regulatory actions in subsequent years, starting with the Basel

237. Id.
238. GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P.
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE
(2009).
239. CROUHY ET AL., supra note 50, at 187-88; see also PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES,
supra note 46, at 9-10. A risk management text frames value-at-risk techniques in terms of
the questions they answer as follows:
[Value-at-risk] is not the answer to the simple question: How much can I lose
on my portfolio over a given time period? The answer to this question is
“everything,” or almost the entire value of the portfolio! . . . Instead, [value-atrisk] offers a probability statement about the potential change in the value of a
portfolio resulting from a change in market factors, over a specified period of
time. [Value-at-risk] is the answer to the following question . . . : What is the
maximum loss over a given time period such that there is a low probability, say
a 1 percent probability, that the actual loss over the given period will be
larger?
CROUHY ET AL., supra note 50, at 187.
240. PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 11.
241. Id. at 13-14.
242. Id. at 12, 15.
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Committee’s incorporation of internal models into capital regulation.
In 1988, the Basel Committee had published its International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, known as the
“Basel Accord” or, more familiarly, as “Basel I.” 243 The Basel I regime,
which applied to internationally active banks, represented the first
multilateral coordinated system concerning the imposition of credit risk
capital requirements. Basel I aimed to ensure banks possessed an adequate
capital cushion to cover unanticipated losses due to credit risk—that is, the
risk that borrowers or other counterparties default on their obligations.
Four years later, the Basel Committee commenced work on a series of
amendments to the Basel I regime that would address the burgeoning levels
of market risk to which banks had become exposed due in part to their
derivatives activities.244
A brief note on capital requirements is in order here. Regulators
impose capital requirements to promote the solvency of banks. Because a
rash of bank insolvencies can threaten ripple effects to the broader
economy—a classic negative externality or “social bad”—public policy
mandates a regulatory response, which has traditionally taken the form of
government safety nets. However, the safety nets such as the explicit and
implicit state guarantees in the form of deposit insurance and in extremis
support from central banks, attenuate the force of ordinary market
mechanisms to discipline bank management and heighten the need for a
further public law intervention to minimize resort to government
guarantees. This is where capital requirements come in: as a fix for a sort
of corporate governance gap that otherwise biases bank managers towards
excessive risk-taking. They might be conceived of as the contractual
protections, analogous to covenants in private creditor loan agreements and
indentures, that the government, as the ultimate risk-bearer, demands. In
other words, if depositors and other creditors did not receive some sort of
government guarantee, they would likely check bank risk-taking. As a
mechanical matter, capital requirements are, roughly speaking, minimum
net worth requirements that are calibrated to the perceived riskiness of a
bank’s asset profile, such that a bank holding a large proportion of risky
assets, such as developing market corporate loans, will be required to
maintain a greater net worth than a bank whose assets consist exclusively
of government bonds. Capital requirements, then—because they consist of
governmental mandates imposed as a response to the threat of negative
243. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988) (updated April 1998), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf.
244. See Weber, supra note 153, at 822-29 (describing the subsequent efforts of the
Basel Committee).
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externalities resulting from market failures—are distinguishable from
purely privatized risk management.245 The market risk amendments,
however, erased this distinction and linked public capital regulation to
private risk management. Specifically, the market risk amendments,
finalized in 1996, pegged banks’ market risk capital requirements to the
results of the value-at-risk estimations performed by the banks’ own
internal risk management departments.246
The market risk amendments themselves are intricate, but two aspects
bear mention here. First, the gist of the new market risk capital
requirement would require banks to maintain capital with respect to each
market risk exposure in an amount sufficient to withstand the maximum
loss over a ten-day period at a ninety-nine percent confidence level—the
loss that the bank’s risk managers, using their proprietary and historical
valuation models, are, statistically speaking, ninety-nine percent sure the
bank will not incur.247 Second, the amendments effectuated a dramatic shift
in discretion away from accountable public administrators and towards
private firms unaccountable to the constituencies for whom the public law
intervention was necessary.
Here we see the principles set forth in the Group of Thirty report
incorporated into law. Prior to the market risk amendments, banks had
sought for years to persuade regulators to tie capital requirements to risk
management value-at-risk models.248 And the Basel Committee did not
stop with market risk. In 2004, the Basel Committee published a
comprehensive capital regulation framework, popularly known as “Basel
245. Looked at from the perspective of bank regulators, capital requirements
complement risk management systems. See, e.g., FCA Interest Rate Risk Management
Amendment, supra note 138, at 39,219 (suggesting that “new interest rate risk
[management] regulations and policy statement will improve FCA oversight of the System
by supplementing existing capital regulations, which specifically address only credit risk.”);
see also Regulatory Capital: Interest Rate Risk Component: Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 55 Fed. Reg. 53,529, 53,531 (proposed Dec. 31, 1990) (imposing an interest
rate risk capital requirement while at the same time applauding the adoption of “meaningful
interest rate risk management programs and hedging strategies” following “the stress of the
1979-82 period”).
246. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD TO
INCORPORATE
MARKET
RISKS
(1996),
available
at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24.pdf?noframes=1. Banks technically had the option to opt
for a “standardized” approach that set forth fixed, computational formulas. See Weber,
supra note 153, at 822-23 (distinguishing the Basel Committee’s amendment from previous
regulatory efforts because it allowed regulated banks to choose the standard or internal
models methods for computing capital risk charges).
247. Id. at 823.
248. See, e.g., Regulatory Capital: Interest Rate Component, 55 Fed. Reg. 53,529
(proposed Dec. 31, 1990) (encouraging the practice of tying capital requirements to interest
rates).
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II,” that, among other things, allowed banks to set their credit risk capital
requirements by reference to estimates of (i) probability of default and (ii)
losses in the event of default generated internally by banks’ risk
management units.249 Even more provocatively, the Basel II framework
would permit banks to determine their capital requirements covering
operational risk by reference to internally-generated estimates of loss.250
With Basel II, capital adequacy became definitively joined at the hip to risk
management. In the words of the vice-chairman of the FRB at the time
Roger Ferguson, Basel II was “as much a proposal for strengthening risk
management as it is a proposal for improving capital standards.”251 To
Ferguson, “these considerations are, as they should be, inseparable.”252
By embracing value-at-risk and related quantitative risk estimation
techniques as tools of capital regulation, the Basel Committee made two
related, but distinct, assumptions that introduce the central theme of the
alternative story. The first assumption was that the internal estimates by
bank risk management units were reliable. We have already seen how the
regulation of risk management in connection with the examination process
increasingly came to embrace this view.253 The problems with this
assumption have been taken up exhaustively in the literature, but certain
aspects bear mention here as reflective of normative assumptions about
what risk assessment entails.254 As a general background observation, the
widespread unreliability of financial models by which bank capital levels
were set—for both internal risk management purposes and, for those
jurisdictions that had implemented the Basel II framework, for regulatory
capital purposes—was a central factor in the meltdown of the financial
system in 2008.255 Simply put, the models failed to signal credit, market,
249. See Weber, supra note 154, at 827-28 (describing key input parameters under the
internal ratings basis models).
250. See id. at 828-29 (noting that Basel II required banks to include a charge against
operation risk based on their own risk calculations). Operational risk was defined as “the
risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or
from external events.’” BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 55.
251. Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice-Chairman, Bd. Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., Remarks
at the ICBI Risk Management 2003 Conference, Geneva, Switzerland, (Dec. 2, 2003),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20031202/default.htm; see also
HULL, supra note 59, at 188 (interpreting the Basel Committee’s decision to require an
operational risk capital requirement in part as a push to make banks “pay more attention to
their internal systems to avoid catastrophes”).
252. Ferguson, supra note 252.
253. See supra Part II.C.
254. See Allen & Saunders, supra note 56, at 97 (noting that value-at-risk “is a risk
measurement, not a risk management question”).
255. See James Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk Management
in Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 731, 735-46 (2009).
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and liquidity risks in a manner that was effectively communicated to bank
management. One pre-crisis survey of empirical work on value-at-risk
models closes with the following summation: “So, in short, we ought to be
able to identify most bad [value-at-risk] models, but the more worrying
issue is whether we can find any good ones.”256 The chief technical
limitations of value-at-risk models follow from their reliance on historical
data:257 first, such reliance in the context of a value-at-risk model implicitly
assumes that future losses cannot exceed past losses and second, the results
of the model are highly sensitive to the look back period on which the
model is based.258 Even when banks model time stochastically—i.e., by
random computer simulations—the assumptions are deterministic and are
therefore static.259
A more fundamental limitation follows from the nature of the question
it answers. Recall that value-at-risk models determine a loss level that,
statistically speaking, will not be exceeded at a specified confidence level
(e.g., ninety-nine percent). But the premises of this question reflect
normative assumptions about the risk assessment process. Even if risk
managers construct a reliable, robust model, the model will yield the
minimum worst loss—i.e., the upper bound of the range that the model was
ninety-nine percent confident total losses would not exceed—rather than
the expected worst loss.260 If the model were ninety-nine percent confident
that losses would not exceed $100 million, it would be entirely silent about
the relative likelihood that a rare event would result in a $110 million loss
or a $100 billion loss. Moreover, the model results are highly sensitive to
the selection of the time horizon. Banks universally use a one-day time
horizon to measure market risk exposure, which gauges a bank’s
vulnerability to losses over the next twenty-four-hour-period. However,
the Basel Committee has recently observed that “to determine the level of
capital necessary to remain in business after sustaining a large loss, risk
must be assessed over a longer holding period.”261 In the Basel
Committee’s defense, the Basel II framework provided for mandatory
256. Dowd, supra note 24, at 183, 202.
257. See Hull, supra note 5959 (describing how value-at-risk techniques rely on
historical data to generate a probability distribution of future exposures).
258. See, e.g., Tanya Beder, VaR: Seductive But Dangerous, 51 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 12
(1995) (examining eight common value-at-risk methodologies and finding that the resulting
exposure estimates varied by as much as fourteen times on the same portfolio).
259. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, FUNDAMENTAL REVIEW OF THE
TRADING BOOK 59 (2012) [hereinafter TRADING BOOK REVIEW], available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs219.pdf (discussing the limitations of continuous stochastic
processes in value-at-risk models).
260. See René Stulz, Risk Management Failures: What Are They and When Do They
Happen?, 20 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 58, 61 (2008) (discussing the mismeasurement of risk).
261. TRADING BOOK REVIEW, supra note 260, at 61.
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dialogues between banks and regulators concerning modeling assumptions
and “backtesting” of models (i.e., comparing model predictions with actual
results) with capital step-ups for banks with underperforming models.262 It
also imposed qualitative and quantitative prerequisites for eligibility to use
internal models.263
To develop further certain of the qualitative
prerequisites, the OCC published guidance in 2000 concerning model
validation.264 These prerequisites and requirements have served to bolster
the reliability of the models, but they were silent concerning key issues of
how banks identify and explore threats as part of their risk assessment
process.
The second assumption was that a quantitative approach to risk
management should comprise the backbone of the new regulatory
environment.265 By thoroughly mathematizing the regulatory capital
system, regulators implicitly endorsed such an approach. Though
regulatory guidance has from time to time addressed the need to
complement quantitative, mathematical models with judgment and
experience, the guidance has been vague and largely duplicative of the
extant risk management regulatory guidance. Against this background, the
qualitative dimension of risk management emerges as more of a conceptual
placeholder than a substantive directive—a reference to an acknowledged,
but ultimately unresolved, problem. Both the quantitative emphasis and the
value-at-risk methodologies themselves reflect a broader problem with the
risk assessment process that underpins the alternative story discussed
below: while regulators have demanded ever greater levels of risk control,
they have failed to engage sufficiently on the political-rhetorical task of
threat identification and the descriptive-relational task of exploring the
causal environments within which the threats operate.

262. BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 5555, at 191-97. The regulator-bank dialogue is
frustrated by the lack of a credible alternative to approval on the part of the regulator.
TRADING BOOK REVIEW, supra note 259, at 8-9.
263. BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 5555, at 191-97. The qualitative pre-requisites
to the market risk internal models approach echo the then-existing guidance applicable
generally to risk management systems, including, among other things, independence of the
risk management unit, active involvement of the board and senior management, existence of
risk limits tied to risk management models, internal audit functions, and adequate internal
controls. Id. at 191-93. Certain internal model-specific pre-requisites also applied, such as
the existence of a backtesting program, ongoing validation of models, the integration of the
model into day-to-day risk management practices (as opposed to regulatory capital
purposes), and a rigorous program of stress testing. Id.
264. OCC MODEL VALIDATION GUIDANCE, supra note 126.
265. See generally PABLO TRIANA, THE NUMBER THAT KILLED US: A STORY OF MODERN
BANKING, FLAWED MATHEMATICS, AND A BIG FINANCIAL CRISIS (2012) (discussing value-atrisk and its role in financial crises).
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THE ALTERNATIVE STORY: RISK MANAGEMENT REGULATION
AS CONCEPTUAL CRUTCH

“Can we know the risks we face, now or in the future? No, we cannot;
but yes, we must act as if we do.”266 So opens an essay with a pithy
distillation of the crux of an alternative story of the history of risk
management regulation. Part II presents the traditional story of risk
management, according to which regulatory interventions are practical,
functional responses to threats to the achievement of regulators’ statutory
mandates of financial stability and institution-level safety and soundness.
As further risks and vulnerabilities were discovered, the regulatory system
deputized risk management departments to counteract them, providing ever
more detailed guidance and imposing ever-wider expectations along the
way. The alternative story, by contrast, acknowledges the empirical fact of
risk management as an enhanced organizational and regulatory priority, but
interrogates its normative assumptions. It presents the regulatory focus on
risk management as more of a cultural crutch in response to growing
anxiety about endemic uncertainty—as a reflection of the aspirations
underlying the practice rather than the practice as such.267 It sees in risk
management a placeholder delimiting the range of objects that demand
organizational control rather than the range of objects that are in fact
susceptible to such control. It “is a practice which must work because it is
demanded.”268
Michael Power’s analysis of audit and risk management as cultural
systems lays the groundwork for this alternative story. Power describes the
late 1980s and early 1990s as the era of the “audit society”—a period in
which audit systems proliferated in a wide variety of contexts.269 We have
seen how risk management grew out of internal control logic, which itself
can be thought of as a sort of permanent, systemic state of internal audit.
His observations on the audit society therefore resonate with risk
management too. Power adopted the term “audit society” to refer “to the
tendencies revealed by these commitments rather than an objectively
identifiable state of affairs.”270 The “official meta-accounts” of auditing
refer to the aspirations of the audit, typically the prevention of fraud, but
the methodological common sense practices of auditing are heterogeneous

266. MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY
SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 1 (1982).
267. POWER, supra note 17, at 4.
268. Id. at 11 (writing of audit systems).
269. Id. passim.
270. Id. at 4.

ON THE

WEBER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1060

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/21/2013 4:53 PM

[Vol. 15:4

and diverse.271 To Power, “the idea of audit” is inherently ambiguous
because “the word is not used simply descriptively to refer to particular
practices, but normatively in the context of demands and aspirations for
accountability and control.”272 In the process, real operational capabilities
diverge from the programmatic promises of the audit.273
In the regulatory context, public law authorities impose audit
requirements as an adaptive response to transformations in conceptions of
the administrative state, so as to secure continued legitimacy through the
appearance of control. The problem of mismatched aspirations and
operations is most pronounced where audited systems produce outputs that
are ill-defined such as “true and fair financial statements.”274 Such opaque
outcomes are unlike, say, a wheelbarrow’s fitness for purpose. In the case
of the fitness of wheelbarrows, the effectiveness of a quality assurance
program (QAP) for manufacturing processes is tightly coupled with the
wheelbarrow product output. If the QAP certifies the fitness of the
wheelbarrows and the manufacturer is inundated with warranty claims then
the QAP will be exposed as inadequate. Where, on the other hand, outputs
are not easily observed, the regulatory certification of auditable internal
control systems can take on a life of its own. In extreme cases, such
auditable systems “exist for the [sole] purpose of being externally verified”
by a regulator that, bearing in mind the irreducible opacity of outputs, is
unable to verify in a meaningful sense.275 Ultimately Power withholds
express judgment on the effectiveness of the audit society’s control logic,276
but he exposes several flanks in its underlying assumptions that skeptical
researchers can attack.
Given the historical and conceptual linkages between internal control
and risk management, it is not surprising that following his study of the
audit society, Power next turned his attention to the risk management
world. Again, the inquiry is not into the body of technical practices
performed by risk managers as much as into how the idea of risk
management is implemented at the organizational level.277 Our ideas of
271. Id. at 9. “Instead of a clear conception of output, auditing is constituted by a range
of procedures backed by experience and judgment.” Id. at 69; see also id. at 89 (describing
the “technological base” of auditing as a “diverse and humble assemblage of routines,
practices, and economic constraints”).
272. Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).
273. Id. at 9 (referring to the divergence as the “loose coupling in the auditing field
between accounts of potential and operational capability”); id. at 89 (referring to the
“imperfect coupling between programmatic demands for control and the realities of
operationalizing it”).
274. Id. at 85.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 89 (reserving final judgment for the empiricists).
277. Id. at 24.

WEBER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

8/21/2013 4:53 PM

THE LAW AND REGULATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT

1061

what is subject to control or management affect the practices by which we
control risks and change our expectations concerning the controllability of
newly emergent, or newly recognized, risks. In fact, our very idea of what
constitutes a risk is inevitably affected by the practices and expectations of
risk management. Risk managers construct question-solving models that
beget other challenges demanding the same rationalized control.278 New
ideas about risk management are therefore “performative” inasmuch as
they “establish new normative climates for decision making and determine
the way specific risk objects are ‘conceptualized, identified . . . and
managed’.”279
Power describes a transition from risk analysis to risk governance that
is characterized by a corporate-managerial ideal. Whereas the risk
governance challenge for risk regulators in the decades leading up to the
1990s was how to develop and select among models to “populate the
content of risk knowledge,” the mid-1990s reflected a new focus on the
“models of the management process within which risk analysis
operates.”280 The shift to “managerial forms of risk governance” on the
part of risk regulators is potentially defensive. By seeking to govern risk
management, regulators are engaging, at least in part, in a “strategy to
govern unruly perceptions and to maintain the production of legitimacy” in
the face of heightened anxiety about risk.281 Risk governance co-exists
with a “logic of opportunity”282 that sees risk not merely as a threat but also
as an entrepreneurial opportunity. For example, the introductory paragraph
of the COSO ERM framework heralds ERM’s ability to equip management
not only to “effectively deal with uncertainty and associated risk[,]” but
also to take advantage of “opportunity” and to “enhanc[e] the capacity to
build value.”283 This logic of opportunity has a moral dimension as well,
and speaks to a new organizational self, capable of self-improvement and
learning, facing, and managing risk in a rationalized and systematic way.284
278. See PAT O’MALLEY, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND GOVERNMENT 2 (2004) (“Risk
society theorists further argue that risk-based predictions deliver insecurity rather than
security, for the more that science discovers, the more it demonstrates that life is saturated
with risks.”).
279. POWER, supra note 4, at 28 (quoting James F. Short, Jr., Defining, Explaining, and
Managing Risks, in ORGANIZATIONS, UNCERTAINTIES AND RISKS 39 (Lee Ben Clarke &
James F. Short eds., 1992)).
280. Id. at 20.
281. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
282. Id. at 23.
283. COSO ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 217, at 1.
284. Of course, there is nothing new about financial institutions, or any other business
enterprise, taking an entrepreneurial view of risk. To the contrary, that truism is the
backbone of the capitalist economy. See, e.g., ASWATH DAMODARAN, STRATEGIC RISK
TAKING: A FRAMEWORK FOR RISK MANAGEMENT 8 (2008) (“[E]xposure[] to some risk is an
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Ulrich Beck described late twentieth century society as a “risk
society,” by which he meant to denote a period when “unknown and
unintended consequences come to be a dominant force in history and
society.”285 The moving force behind the shift to the modern risk society
consists in “the expansion of culturally produced, interdependent
insecurities and dangers, and the resulting dominance of the public
perception of risk as staged by the mass media.”286 According to this view,
modernity has made substantial progress in eliminating abject poverty and
hunger, but has created an array of new pervasive risks that threaten often
imperceptible and latent hazards.287 Beck predicted that societies will
increasingly struggle over the distribution of these risks the way that former
societies were characterized by struggles over the distribution of goods and
resources.288 For example, modern risk-producing technologies such as
nuclear power plants are insusceptible to traditional forms of normative
political deliberation and control due to their intergenerational impact.289 A
variation on the same theme is the image of a “runaway world.”290
Theorists adopting this broad view have accordingly lamented the
“pretence of control over the uncontrollable” and view risk management
primarily as a discursive practice aimed at legitimating a new untamable
risk environment by portraying it as something that can be managed,
controlled, and directed.291 The proliferation of risk management literature
and practices starting in the mid-1990s292 reflects less of a breakthrough in
damage control and more of an “increase in social expectations about the
decidability and management of dangers and opportunities.”293 In fact, risk
integral part of success.”). What is noteworthy, however, is the newfound confidence of
institutions like banks to understand and quantify risk and apply it to decision processes in a
systematized, rationalized manner.
285. ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY 22 (Mark Ritter trans. 1992) [hereinafter BECK, RISK
SOCIETY].
286. ULRICH BECK, THE COSMOPOLITAN VISION 22 (Ciarin Cronin trans. 2006)
[hereinafter BECK, THE COSMOPOLITAN VISION].
287. See BECK, THE COSMOPOLITAN VISION, supra note 287, at 19-23; see also Morgan,
supra note 15, at 5 (“The statistical evidence shows that Americans live longer, healthier,
and wealthier lives today than they did at any time in the past. Perhaps, some economists
argue, we worry more about risk today precisely because we have more to lose . . . .”).
288. BECK, RISK SOCIETY, supra note 286, at 20.
289. See id. at 162 (discussing the environmental movement’s increased focus on
“threats that sometimes will not even take their toll in the lifespan of the affected
individuals, but only in the second generation of their offspring”).
290. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD: HOW GLOBALIZATION IS RESHAPING
OUR LIVES 23 (2000) (discussing the limits of parliamentary democracy exposed by
globalization).
291. BECK, THE COSMOPOLITAN VISION, supra note 287, at 22.
292. POWER, supra note 4, at 3.
293. Id. at 5.
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might be distinguished from uncertainty on the grounds that risks are
objects of organized management and control.294 Risk management is then
properly conceived of as the rhetorical and political practices by which risk
objects achieve salience within an organization, as well as the
organizational responses to threats and opportunities the risk object
presents. Power describes this process as follows:
Since the mid-1990s, new categories and ideas have re-shaped
discourses of risk management, giving them a more central role
in organizational governance, aligning them with ideals of
enterprise and subsuming more traditional forms of risk analysis.
This re-organization and reconceptualization of management
activity in the name of risk marks a distinctive form of
administrative innovation, involving the diffusion of new process
frameworks[;] the organization of new concepts of risk and its
management; and the creation of new classes of organizational
actors as authorized representatives of best risk practice.295
Thus, according to the alternative story the risk management revolution is a
reflection of the anxiety resulting from the loss of control.
We have seen in Part II how regulatory interventions into internal
controls and risk management made increasingly ambitious demands of
bank management to monitor and control risk during the 1980s and 1990s.
The traditional story sees a management-based regulatory regime in these
developments. Implicit in the prominence of internal control mandates was
an acknowledgement that performance-based regulation of certain difficult
to monitor outputs of regulatory interest (e.g., control over bribes) was not
on its own sufficient to achieve certain objectives. Similarly, commandand-control technology-based regulatory approaches were viewed
skeptically on account of their failure to take into account the heterogeneity
of firm-specific circumstances. The legal regime, therefore, turned
organizations (and its own attention) inward rather than outward, focusing
on the corporate procedures on which outcomes of regulatory interest
depended. Whereas the internal control mandates applied in most cases to
all companies, the regulation of risk management as such took off in the
bank regulatory context. This regulatory program is characterized by the
allocation of responsibility to boards and senior management to manage
risks; the description of specific risks that must be monitored, controlled,
and communicated throughout the enterprise; and, in its final expression,
the imposition of a mandate to account for the interconnectedness of risks
throughout the enterprise in a comprehensive risk management program.

294. Id. at 6.
295. Id. at 28-29.
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Over time the approach evolved away from simple responsibility allocation
to comprehensive, enterprise-wide risk management to take into account
technological advances pioneered by banks’ internal risk management
departments.
The recent track record, however, belies key tenets of the traditional
story and supports instead the alternative story. Despite the hands-on
involvement of regulators in the promotion of norms and practices, the
success of the collection of practices and techniques comprising risk
management in the banking sector has been equivocal. As a 2009 OECD
research paper noted, risk management is “accepted by all” though its
“track record is poor[.]”296 These failures of risk management can be
analyzed in the context of the broad assessment-and-control framework set
forth above in Part I to see how the realities fell short of the promise of risk
management. To review briefly, risk management describes the idea
motivating practices that assess and seek to control risk and uncertainty.
The assessment process has a political-rhetorical dimension that answers
the question “What objectives matter to the organization, and what
threatens them?” and a descriptive-relational dimension that answers the
question “In what ways do future contingent events affect the achievement
of these objectives?” The risk control process describes the practices and
techniques by which organizations utilize the knowledge obtained from the
assessment process in corporate governance to achieve control. Though the
distinction between risk assessment and risk management is admittedly
blurry, the central themes of the traditional story—responsibility allocation,
risk description/communication, and comprehensive enterprise-wide risk
management—focus on the risk control process.
To an exponent of the alternative story, the poor record of risk
management regulation is not surprising. The shaping of risk management
norms, particularly its control processes, by regulators is more a reflection
of the pretense of control than an authentic enhancement in the
functionality of the techniques and methods. As the legal-regulatory
infrastructure for the corporate governance of risk control took shape, the
risk assessment process remained underdeveloped. Neither practitioners
nor regulators devoted adequate attention to the processes by which risks
are identified and their causal environments discovered, or, in other words,
to the risk assessment process.
Management researcher Anette Mikes has documented what she terms
the “quantitative enthusiasm” that pervades risk management
departments.297 In her recent field-based research at financial institutions,

296. OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6.
297. Calculative Cultures, supra note 127, at 35.
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she identified two predominant types of “calculative cultures”: quantitative
skepticism and the quantitative enthusiasm.298 This meticulous field
research is helpful to develop the catch-all references to the “tone at the
top” and “firm culture” that appear in both practitioner and academic
literature.299 As a result of the division, the risk management profession is,
according to Mikes, “at a crossroads.”300 Banks have also largely
committed themselves to a particular calculative culture in a path
dependent way, so shifting dramatically to another calculative culture will
entail significant costs as the risk management function builds the requisite
resources and capabilities.301
Mikes describes adherents of quantitative enthusiasm in the following
terms:
[They believe] that the increasing ability of data and rising
sophistication of risk modeling render more and more risk types
manageable by numbers. “Quantitative enthusiasts” aim to
replace judgmental risk assessments with risk quantification.
They believe that risk measures are capable of reflecting the
underlying economic reality reliably enough to induce requisite
economic behaviors. Adherents put a high priority on building,
maintaining and improving the “robustness” and “accuracy” (i.e.
the relevance and reliability) of their analytical models. They
also seek to extend risk model[]ing, albeit complemented with
qualitative methods, [to] strategic and operational risk issues. . . .
[They] strive to capture the complexity of risk decisions in the
model design, including much judgment upfront, so that the
output of models can be a close proxy to the underlying risk
profile. In this case, risk models reduce decision uncertainty, in
the sense that they minimise room for disagreement among
decision makers on the validity of the model output. . . . [Because
many] judgmental issues are resolved in the model[]ing design,
298. See id. at 35; Anette Mikes, Chief Risk Officers at Crunch Time: Compliance
Champions or Business Partners, 2 J. RISK MGM’T IN FIN. INSTITUTIONS 7 (2008)
[hereinafter CROs in Crunch Time].
299. See, e.g., THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE ROLE OF U.S. CORPORATE BOARDS IN
ENTERPRISE
RISK
MANAGEMENT
23
(2006),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=941179 (“Directors repeatedly said that
when it comes to risk management, tone at the top is critical.”); INST. INTERNAL AUDITORS,
TONE AT THE TOP: PUTTING COSO’S THEORY INTO PRACTICE (2005);
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INVESTIGATION INTO FOREIGN EXCHANGE LOSSES AT THE
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK 4 (2004) (“Ultimately, the Board and the CEO must accept
responsibility for the ‘tone at the top’ and the culture that exists in certain parts of [the
firm]”).
300. CROs in Crunch Time, supra note 299, at 16.
301. See id. at 20-21 (discussing the costs involved in successfully developing both
strategic advisor and strategic controller roles).
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little or no disagreement surrounds the risk-adjusted performance
metrics, enabling decision makers to manage risky ventures by
the numbers . . . .302
Of particular note from the perspective of modeling is that the risk
manager’s effort is front-loaded: once the risk manager creates a reliable
and robust model, the model is set in motion according to largely
automated corporate risk management procedures such as risk limits. The
risk assessment process is therefore crucial as threats need to be identified
and the causal environment affecting them must be adequately addressed in
the model. This point cannot be overestimated: when banks use value-atrisk modeling techniques, the perceived risk of a position, portfolio, or firm
depends in large part “on whether one technicality is used instead of
another when designing [the] quantitative machine.”303
The quantitative skeptic, by contrast, regards risk measurements as
trend indicators to be taken into account alongside “managerial discretion,
experience, and judgment.”304 Faith in modeling is not unique to the
quantitative enthusiasts; the development of risk models is at the heart of
both calculative cultures.305 But the quantitative skeptic is mindful of the
ability to model. Compared to the enthusiast, the skeptic marshals fewer
institutional resources to create the perfect model and more resources on
the back end where model results are contextualized. The skeptics make
extensive use of mathematical models as “learning tool[s]” in a multi-factor
judgment process.306 Skeptics are particularly wary about the use of
models in connection with operational and strategic risks.307
Risk managers face competing demands from a diverse array of
stakeholders, including creditors, regulators, corporate executives,
shareholders, and even the general public.308 The resulting accountability
challenge highlights the political-rhetorical nature of risk assessment.
Stated another way, the diversity of calculative cultures follows from the
302. Id. at 14-15.
303. Pablo Triana, JPMorgan’s “Whale” Makes Big Splash on Key Risk Model, FIN.
TIMES, May 29, 2012, at 20.
304. CROs in Crunch Time, supra note 298, at 15.
305. Id.; Calculative Cultures, supra note 127, at 7 (“Risk management tools tend to be
highly analytical, data-driven techniques. These are likely to strike a different chord in
different managerial cultures.”).
306. Id. at 36.
307. CROs in Crunch Time, supra note 299, at 8.
308. See COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP III, CONTAINING SYSTEMIC
RISK: THE ROAD TO REFORM: THE REPORT OF THE CRMPG III 71 (2008) [hereinafter
CRMPG III REPORT], available at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/docs/CRMPG-III.pdf
(“The goal of risk management is not to eliminate . . . risk, but to manage it effectively to
provide the stakeholders of the institutions with long-term returns commensurate with the
risk.”).
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political-rhetorical nature of these negotiations with various stakeholders.
For example, shareholders and executives generally prefer a quantitatively
enthusiastic risk management orientation.309 Such an approach affords
executives operational ease and certainty, permitting them to conduct
operations consistent with a given risk-and-return level.310 Similarly,
quantitative enthusiasm assures shareholders that corporate decisions can
be made according to a shareholder value imperative by optimizing returns
for a given amount of risk, as well as cutting administrative costs
associated with more nuanced, layered decisional frameworks. 311 But this
diversity persists in part because regulatory attention has preferred to focus
on ever-broader visions of controls over the risk assessment process. Thus,
banks face a series of regulatory guidelines that are at once more ambitious
in scope, yet increasingly distant from key issues of how risk impacts
corporate and regulatory goals. Simplifying only slightly, regulators
command banks to control risk but offer little guidance on what constitutes
a threat requiring attention (the political-rhetorical dimension of risk
assessment) and how risk management departments should develop their
understanding of how the threat might materialize (the descriptiverelational dimension of risk assessment). An influential industry-funded
study of risk management notes that:
[D]espite all of the complexities of risk management, the essence
of risk monitoring and risk management is quite straightforward.
Specifically, risk monitoring and management reduces to the
basics of getting the right information, at the right time, to the
right people, such that those people can make the most informed
judgments possible.312
Industry norms and regulatory guidance have made clear that senior
management and, eventually, the board of directors are the “right people.”
In so doing, those corporate actors are made accountable and responsible
for risk. But what is the “right information”? Regulatory guidance has
generally avoided answering this question.
It might be objected that regulators have repeatedly intervened into
risk management by describing the risks that must be subject to corporate
control. Indeed, risk description is one of the three overarching themes of
the regulation of bank risk management described in Part II above. For
309. Calculative Cultures, supra note 127, at 3, 36.
310. See Bhimani, supra note 109, at 3 (“The operationalization of risk management is
ultimately aided by the capacity to regard risk as amenable to calculability and economistic
representation.”).
311. See id. at 2; Calculative Cultures, supra note 127, at 1 (observing that risk
management “by the numbers” is “driven by a strong shareholder value imperative”).
312. CRMPG III REPORT, supra note 308 at 70.
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instance, the OCC handbook for examiners instructs its examiners to be
mindful of eight specific categories of risk: credit, interest rate, liquidity,
price, operational, compliance, strategic, and reputation. The Basel
Committee has mandated specific capital charges based on risk
management models applied with respect to market risk, credit risk, and
operational risk. Part II describes in some detail how bank regulators have
provided extensive guidance with respect to certain categories of risk. But
these descriptions indicate general categories of potential exposures. It is
difficult to imagine any threat not easily falling into one of those
categories. While they are helpful to frame issues of risk and, perhaps
more importantly, constitute a risk object for which responsibility must be
allocated, they do not perform the difficult analytical work of identifying
and measuring, probabilistically or otherwise, the contingent events that
threaten those objectives.
As Power noted, whether risk management—or, for that matter, the
regulation of risk management—achieves its purposes for a given task is an
empirical question.313 This article does not take up that research task, but a
brief examination of some recent failures of risk management helps set out
in relief the concerns that the alternative story presents with respect to risk
management regulation. Recent financial history demonstrates that risk
management failures are commonplace, notwithstanding the expanding
canon of regulatory guidance devoted to risk management.
Some conceptual splitting is necessary here. From the perspective of
a bank’s board of directors and management, a risk management system
will have failed if it does not perform as designed. Typically, it will not
have facilitated the assumption of risks in line with the risk appetite set by
the board as implemented by senior management (Type 1 failure).
Provided that the board and management have established and
implemented risk preferences, Type 1 failures generally will result from
errors in risk control, as distinguished from risk assessment. By contrast,
from the perspective of bank regulators, a risk management system will
have failed if its operation compromises the public regulatory objectives of
financial stability and institutional safety and soundness. Typically it will
have failed to prevent an institutional or system-wide crisis (Type 2
failures). Type 2 failures can relate either to risk control or risk
assessment. The set of circumstances giving rise to Type 1 failures
overlaps, but is not coextensive, with the set of circumstances giving rise to
Type 2 failures.314 Consider the recent example of J.P. Morgan
313. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
314. See René M. Stulz, Risk Management Failures: What Are They and When Do They
Happen? 5 (Ohio State Univ., Fisher Coll. of Bus., Charles A. Dice Ctr. for Research in Fin.
Econ., Working Paper No. 2008-03-017, 2008) (“A decision to take a known risk may turn
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management authorizing a derivatives trading program, which they knew to
be risky, involving a multi-part hedge of a credit derivatives index. It
resulted in a multi-billion dollar loss due to a failure to foresee the effects
of an unpredicted event. Such circumstances describe an obvious Type 2
failure. Bank regulators, charged with supervising institutional safety and
soundness and systemic stability, would have preferred risk management
systems in place to prevent such a risky trading program. But if
management assumed the risk voluntarily, then the losses do not represent
a Type 1 failure. Under those circumstances, the bank’s risk preferences
influenced the construction of its analytical model and dictated the
seriousness with which top decision makers in business units (including
their unit risk managers) and the firm-wide risk management unit
considered possible downside scenarios. From the perspective of bank
management, no risk management failure would have occurred. Instead, it
is the downside case of the old adage, “You win some, you lose some.” Of
course, there is nothing objectionable with a bank taking an entrepreneurial
approach to risk-taking, but regulators and banks naturally have different
tolerances for different types of risk.
The report to shareholders that UBS prepared in the aftermath of its
$20 billion losses associated with subprime-related assets in 2007 provides
illustrations of both types of failures.315 The report cites several Type 1
failures, such as the failure to follow through with plans to hire senior risk
managers in the loss-making unit and insufficient communication between
UBS’s research team, which had discovered deterioration in the subprime
market, and relevant business units.316 These failures violate clear guidance
from bank regulators concerning adequate staffing and communication
concerning risk management, and they would have provided occasion for
examiners to demand changes. To the extent that regulators failed to take
advantage of these opportunities (and it seems they in fact did so), the
designers of regulatory policy might focus on building up on-site
examination capacity and reinforcing, both to regulators and banks, the
importance of these issues. In short, these issues are already addressed in
extant regulatory guidance and require adjustments on the margin in
regulators’ emphasis and tone. To remediate the failures, regulators would
do well to bear in mind the Coglianese-Lazer model of MBR and stress the
importance of planning an informational infrastructure within the firm.
out poorly even though, at the time it was made, the expectation was that taking the risk
increased shareholder wealth and hence was in the best interest of the shareholder.”).
315. UBS, SHAREHOLDER REPORT ON UBS’S WRITE-DOWNS 4 (2008) [hereinafter UBS
SUBPRIME REPORT].
316. See id. at 37-39 (providing a list of decisions that contributed to UBS’s risk
management failures).
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The Type 1 failures contrast with several Type 2 failures identified in
the report. The Type 2 failures reflect shortcomings in the risk assessment
process. For example, risk management at UBS modeled volatility, which
is a key parameter of any financial model, for AAA-rated subprime
exposures in the same manner as it did for other AAA exposures.317 As a
result, its value-at-risk model revealed a minimal exposure at a high
confidence level. UBS compounded its problems by failing to examine the
specific characteristics of the securities that it acquired, in particular highly
structured products such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).318
These CDO securities are derivatives that reference, and are sometimes
collateralized by, other securities that are themselves collateralized, most
often by home mortgages. The report’s findings are remarkably candid:
“[T]here appears not to have been sufficient discussion of or actions upon
concerns surrounding Subprime as an asset class until Q3 2007 . . . .”319 “It
does not appear that [the market risk management team] thoroughly
investigated the CDO business model.”320 Traders were permitted to retain
so-called “super-senior” CDO tranches, which eventually would account
for 50% of total losses at UBS, because risk managers had unwittingly
assumed the market for such tranches would continually expand.321
Perhaps most troublingly, the report found, “[T]here is no indication that
[the market risk management team] was seeking views from other sources
than [the] business [units].”322 UBS failed to conduct any analysis of the
underlying home mortgage assets. In each case, failure to probe the causal
environment linking possible contingent events (i.e., rising defaults among
subprime borrowers) to harms (i.e., massive write-downs that wipe out
earnings and eventually impair capital) contributed to a corporate
catastrophe that eventually resulted in $50 billion in losses and a taxpayerfunded bailout.323 For example, by questioning the validity of AAA ratings
317. Id. at 20, 37.
318. UBS’s CDO desk accounted for two-thirds of the losses addressed in the report.
Id. at 7. The other largest contributors to UBS’s subprime exposure were an asset
management unit and mismanagement of UBS’s group-wide treasury department.
319. Id. at 37.
320. Id. at 40.
321. Id. at 14, 40.
322. Id. at 40. A U.S. Government Accountability Office study of financial regulators’
oversight of risk management systems at large financial institutions revealed that the
problem of excessive deference to business units’ view of risk also affected financial
regulators. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: REVIEW OF
REGULATORS’ OVERSIGHT OF RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AT A LIMITED NUMBER OF LARGE,
COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 19 (2009) [hereinafter GAO RM REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-499T (“Some regulators told us that they had relied
on management representations of risk, especially in emerging areas.”).
323. See Goran Miijuk, Prescription for UBS: ‘Hard Work’, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2009,
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or “looking through” the CDOs to examine the FICO scores or second-lien
status of the underlying mortgages, the causal connections would have been
laid bare.
These Type 2 failures point to a deeper problem relating to a
fundamental failure of imagination by bank boards and managers. When
bank boards and managers decide just how much imagination to exercise
when considering adverse events (or catastrophes), they are engaging the
fundamental political-rhetorical question of risk assessment. An industryfunded diagnostic report on the subprime financial crisis implicitly made
this point in the introductory paragraph to its risk management discussion.
It noted that the “shortcomings in risk monitoring and risk management . . .
reflect the fact that virtually all risk management tools are unable to
model/present the most severe forms of financial shocks in a fashion that is
credible to senior management.”324 The problem is one of capturing the
attention span of management, a political endeavor if there ever was one.
As a counterfactual, imagine a gadfly at meetings of UBS’s chief risk
officer and its investment bank risk and governance committee constantly
urging executives and committee members to approach their analytical
models more skeptically and mindfully, perhaps even to consider the
possibility of a once-in-a-lifetime liquidity crunch and asset value crash.
“Oh,” the gadfly would add, “also consider that the government refuses to
bail us out.” Although the regulators would prefer for such deliberations to
occur during the risk assessment phase, thus far they have not focused on
embedding this perspective in risk management departments.325 It should
not come as a surprise that a 2006 horizontal examination by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York of several large banks revealed that no banks
were considering the possible effects of a severe economic downturn on the
corporate group.326 Instead, risk managers were conducting isolated stress
tests on particular portfolios based on single-parameter events such as
housing market downturns, relying on its intuition with respect to stressed
market events. It is a commonplace that banks and regulators perceive
different threats because they have different institutional objectives:
at C2 (commenting on UBS’ losses and subsequent reorganization); see also TETT, supra
note 238, at 243-44 (discussing the size of the broader bailout bailout).
324. CRMPG III REPORT, supra note 309, at 70 (emphasis added).
325. See Saul Hansell & Joseph B. Treaster, The Job of Imagining the Unimaginable,
and Bracing for It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2001, at C2 (“But the hardest thing for many on
Wall Street—as for individual investors, lenders, insurers, mailroom workers, and frequent
fliers—is trying to conclude which of the dark visions raised in daily news reports is the
next nightmare plausible enough to allow it to color decision-making.”).
326. See GAO RM REPORT, supra note 323, at 22-23 (noting that the stress tests focused
on individual products rather than the institution as a whole and did not include “financial
risks enterprise-wide”).
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regulators are charged with promoting safety and soundness of individual
institutions and stability throughout the financial system, whereas banks
face pressure to meet expectations of shareholders, rating agencies,
regulators, intra-firm business units, and creditors, which represent only a
few of the more prominent stakeholders.327 This divergence affects the risk
assessment process in predictable ways, as safety nets permit banks to
assume super-optimal levels of risk from the perspective of the deposit
insurer and the central bank, which are creditors of last resort. Recall how
Part II.D explained how capital adequacy regulation should be interpreted
as a set of mandatory contract-like provisions, analogous to privately
negotiated debt covenants, designed to protect these creditors from loss.
To the extent that the capital requirements have been made to depend on
risk assessment processes conducted by bank risk management
departments, the divergence emerges as a real public policy problem.
Regulation has only addressed this issue obliquely, failing to confront it
head on.
These microeconomic incentive-related problems with the politicalrhetorical dimension of risk assessment are only part of the problem.
Complexity further frustrates risk assessment along its descriptiverelational dimension. The UBS report describes how “inadequate systems”
and “infrastructure limitations” resulted in an “inability to obtain a
portfolio view” of certain “complex products.”328 These system failures
“became even more problematic with the business growth into more
complex, higher margin products.”329 UBS’s experience in this regard was
hardly unique. The failures of risk modeling in the lead up to the subprime
financial crisis have been documented extensively.330 The main problems
are that the models underlying risk management programs, whether run by
quantitative enthusiasts or skeptics, are unable to represent complex
phenomena. New research by complexity scientists reveals the many ways
in which financial institutions transact in markets that are authentically
complex, rather than merely complicated or difficult to understand.331 The
complex markets in which financial institutions transact render them
“susceptible to unpredictable and nonlinear phase transitions, positive
feedback effects, ‘normal accidents,’ complexity catastrophes, and
327. See SERGIO FOCARDI & CAROLINE JONAS, RISK MANAGEMENT: FRAMEWORK,
METHODS, AND PRACTICE 5-7 (1998) (discussing the multiple objectives of risk management
in financial firms).
328. UBS SUBPRIME REPORT, supra note 316, at 40.
329. Id.
330. See, e.g., OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6 (highlighting
incentive structures, internal controls, and technical assumptions as failures of risk modeling
that contributed to the financial crisis).
331. See Weber, supra note 43, at 645.
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conflicting constraints.”332 This significantly complicates the descriptiverelational dimension of risk assessment. Even where a bank has a clearly
defined risk appetite, it might be impossible to predict when the market
equilibrium on which an analytical model is premised will give way to
disequilibrating shocks. This problem is particularly acute with respect to
value-at-risk models that are designed to disregard the extreme events that
may emerge from market structures. Thus, those risk managers who dream
of a finance theory that approximates the physical sciences are wrong to
hope that “[s]uch a theory . . . would allow us to predict the future course of
events starting from a set of initial data.”333 In reality, quantitative finance
is less a science than it is a phenomenological discipline constructed on
“statistical arguments that are only partially constrained by the real
world.”334 The real world of finance is so complex that the consequences
of hypothetical “Newton’s laws of finance” could not be evaluated
meaningfully.335
Even mere complicatedness, short of authentic
complexity, can result in Type 2 failures. One study found that more
complicated instruments were insusceptible to consistent modeling.
Specifically, a modeler would feed the same data into the model, and the
model would generate two separate exposure estimates that varied by as
much as thirty percent.336 These implementation issues further underscore
the difficulties associated with elaborating causal risk environments.
Under such circumstances, a bank’s institutional imagination in the
political-rhetorical dimension of risk plays an even greater role.
CONCLUSION
This Article exposes several shortcomings of the traditional story of
risk management regulation that portrays risk management as an effective
antidote to instability in the financial sector. The ever-expanding
pretensions of control have in many respects advanced well beyond
practical capabilities. The future success of risk management regulation
will depend on the extent to which bank regulators are able to shape the
risk assessment process in ways that promote the public regulatory goals of
institutional safety and soundness and systemic financial stability. This
332. Id. (internal citations omitted).
333. FOCARDI & JONAS, supra note 327, at 14.
334. JAN W. DASH, QUANTITATIVE FINANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT: A PHYSICIST’S
APPROACH 8 (2004).
335. Id.
336. See Christopher Marshall & Michael Siegel, Value at Risk: Implementing a Risk
Measurement Standard, 4 J. DERIVATIVES 91, 107 (1997) (finding that implementation risk,
which results from the disparity in value-at-risk estimates from the same model, is
especially prevalent for complex financial instruments).
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challenge will to some extent require encouraging banks to “routiniz[e],
even bureaucratiz[e], the exercise of imagination”—an evocative phrase
with which the 9-11 Commission charged federal law enforcement and
foreign intelligence agencies to remediate organizational tendencies to
resist consideration of extreme low-likelihood events.337 In formulating
responses to the challenge, regulators should attempt to encourage banks to
expand the frontier of the possible, looking to how so-called high-reliability
organizations, such as nuclear power plants, aircraft carriers, or air traffic
control systems maintain reliability in conditions of stress and volatility.338
The recent emphasis on stress testing at banks is a welcome overture in this
direction that, if shepherded in the right way, could promise to bolster the
effectiveness of risk management regulation.339 In the same vein, the Basel
Committee announced in May 2012 that it is considering jettisoning the
value-at-risk model for purposes of calculating market risk capital
requirements in favor of an “expected shortfall” model that requires risk
managers to populate the tails of the loss distributions.340

337. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 344 (2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
338. See generally KARL E. WEICK & KATHLEEN M. SUTCLIFFE, MANAGING THE
UNEXPECTED: RESILIENT PERFORMANCE IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY (2d ed. 2007)
(examining how organizations themselves perform in high risk settings).
339. See Weber, supra note 18 (manuscript on file with author) (presenting a framework
to encourage the use of stress tests).
340. Trading Book Review, supra note 260, at 3, 20.

